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Abstract—We advance the state-of-the-art in automated sym-
bolic analysis of ballot secrecy for e-voting protocols by proposing
a method based on analysing three conditions that together imply
ballot secrecy.
Our approach has two main advantages over existing automated
approaches. The first is a substantial expansion of the class of
protocols and threat models that can be automatically analysed:
our approach can systematically deal with (a) honest authorities
present in different phases, (b) threat models in which no dishon-
est voters occur, and (c) protocols whose ballot secrecy depends
on fresh data coming from other phases. The second advantage is
that our approach can significantly improve verification efficiency,
as the individual conditions are often simpler to verify. E.g., for
the LEE protocol, we obtain a speedup of over two orders of
magnitude.
We show the scope and effectiveness of our approach using
ProVerif in several case studies, including the FOO, LEE, JCJ,
and Belenios protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been substantial advances during the last years
in the field of e-voting protocols. Many new approaches have
been developed, and the relevant security properties have
become better understood and agreed upon [1]–[4]. One of
the main properties is that voters’ votes remain private, which
is known as ballot secrecy. Designing protocols that achieve
this has proven subtle: many vulnerabilities have been found
in previously proposed protocols [3], [5], motivating the need
for improved analysis techniques to support the development
of e-voting systems. Unfortunately, the complexity of e-voting
systems makes computational proofs hard, e.g., the computa-
tional proof of Helios from [6] required one person-year.
For classical security protocols, there is mature tool support
in the symbolic model [7]–[10], which enables detecting many
flaws during the protocol design phase, or later, as new threat
models are considered. Verification in this more abstract model
allows for a high level of automation. This notably enables
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security analyses exploring various threat models in order
to provide more fine-grained guarantees (see e.g. [11]–[13]).
However, these tools traditionally did not handle e-voting
protocols [14]. Recently, new symbolic methods have been
proposed [15]–[19] to analyse e-voting protocols. However,
the applicability of these methods is still extremely limited
both in the type of protocols that they can deal with and the
type of security properties (including threat models) that they
analyse (as acknowledged by [14], [17], [20]).
The reasons for these limitations interact in a complex way
with existing approaches. One of the main reason though is
that ballot secrecy is a behavioural equivalence-based property
which is notoriously more difficult to analyse than the more
classical reachability properties. Two effective tools that can
prove such equivalence properties for an unbounded number
of sessions are ProVerif [9] and Tamarin [7]. These tools can
deal with many typical primitives that are used in e-voting
protocols [15], [16], [18], [21]. However, they check for an
abstraction of equivalence (i.e. diff-equivalence) that is rarely
met by typical encodings of e-voting protocols and ballot
secrecy. Thus, in most cases, the analysis results in a spurious
attack (i.e., an attack that is an artefact of the abstraction and
not a real attack on the protocol), and no conclusion can be
drawn about the protocol.
Despite recent efforts to improve the accuracy of the equiv-
alence being checked (e.g., the swapping technique [16], [18]
and the small-attack property [17]), this still effectively limits
the class of e-voting protocols and the threat models to which
existing tools can be successfully applied. More precisely, we
have identified the following limitations from analysing several
case studies and threat models:
(a) Spurious attacks when honest authorities are present in
different phases of the voting process. For many threat
models, this excludes modelling a registrar that distributes
credentials in a registration phase and then commits
credentials of eligible voters to the ballot box in a later
phase, as in JCJ [22] and Belenios [23].
(b) Spurious attacks with ProVerif when ballot secrecy no-
tably relies on the freshness of some data coming from
previous phases. For example, such data can be creden-
tials created during a registration phase, as in JCJ and
Belenios.
(c) Spurious attacks for threat models in which no dishonest
voter is assumed (we will explain later why this is a more
complex case than with dishonest voters that we handle
as well).
(d) The current techniques have scalability issues (for rea-
sons explained later). For instance, we were not able to
obtain results in less than 2 days for the simple protocol
LEE [24].
Contributions. In this work, we advance the state-of-the art
in automated symbolic verification of ballot secrecy in e-
voting protocols. Our key idea is to soundly modularize ballot
secrecy verification. We develop three tight conditions on e-
voting protocols and prove that, together, they imply ballot
secrecy. The three conditions in our theorem are inspired by
our analysis of the different types of attacks on ballot secrecy.
Since each condition focuses on one specific aspect of ballot
secrecy, it is typically simpler to analyse the combination of
the three conditions than to verify ballot secrecy directly, as
was done in prior works. Our conditions and our analysis
algorithm give rise to a new method to verify ballot secrecy,
improving the state of the art in several aspects.
First, our approach expands the class of protocols and threat
models that can be automatically analysed. We notably address
the limitations of the state-of-the-art (a-c) mentioned above.
As demonstrated by our case studies, providing support for
such features is essential for considering flexible threat models
and for establishing more precise security guarantees that also
take important practical aspects of protocols into account, such
as authentication or registration phases, which are often not
considered in the literature.
Second, our approach can significantly improve verification
efficiency (d). The increased efficiency can occur for two main
reasons. First, because each of our conditions focus on one
aspect of the problem and simplifies parts not related to that
aspect, it involves smaller processes that are typically easier to
verify. Second, previous techniques such as the swapping tech-
nique suffer from an exponential blow up related to the number
of processes in each phase. In practice, we typically observe a
speedup of over two orders of magnitude and even cause the
analysis to terminate in cases where it did not do so before.
Third, we use our approach to analyse several new case
studies. Thanks to the flexibility and the large class of
protocols we can deal with, we are able to analyse a
multitude of different threat models allowing comprehensive
comparisons. Moreover, thanks to the aforementioned
advantages, our approach is able to systematically take the
registration phase into account, whereas prior works often
consider registrars as fully honest and not model them. We
successfully automatically analysed the FOO, Lee, JCJ, and
Belenios protocols with respect to various threat models. We
show that our theorem also applies to the Okamoto protocol.
We also revisit the state-of-the-art definition of ballot
secrecy [24], [25] and propose a more accurate variant (i.e.
sound, with less spurious attacks) of ballot secrecy whose
automated verification does not rely on synchronisation
barriers [16], [18], [24]–[26], which was one of the cause of
limitations (a) and (c).
While we present our work in the ProVerif framework,
our results are applicable beyond this specific tool. Indeed,
our conditions and our Main Theorem are stated in a stan-
dard applied π-calculus framework. We also believe that our
conditions shed light on three crucial aspects that e-voting
protocols should enforce; thus improving our understanding
of the complex notion ballot secrecy. Finally, the fact that our
approach is effective for the analysis of ballot secrecy also
suggests that it may be possible to improve the analysis of
other e-voting requirements by adopting a similar strategy.
Outline. We first provide intuition for our approach in Sec-
tion II. In Section III, we present the symbolic model we use to
represent protocols and security properties. We then describe
our framework in Section IV, notably defining ballot secrecy
and the class of e-voting protocols that we deal with. Next, we
formally define our conditions and state our Main Theorem
in Section V. We show the practicality of our approach in
Section VI by explaining how to verify our conditions and
presenting case studies. Finally, we discuss related work in
Section VII and conclude in Section VIII.
Appendix with Supplementary Material. In Appendix A –
D, we describe the formal model in detail. Appendix E
describes the conditions in detail, and Appendix F contains the
full proofs. Some further detail on case studies is described
in Appendix F, and Appendix G and H provides further
explanations and examples for the swapping technique.
II. INTUITION BEHIND OUR APPROACH
a) Links & Ballot Secrecy: Ballot secrecy boils down to
ensuring that an attacker cannot establish a meaningful link
between a specific voter and a specific vote (that this voter
is willing to cast). For instance, a naive example of such a
link occurs when a voter outputs a signed vote in the clear,
explicitly linking his vote to his identity. However, in more
realistic e-voting protocols, such links can be very complex,
possibly relying on long transitive chains of different pieces
of data from different outputs. For example, if an attacker is
able to link a credential with the identity of the recipient voter
during a registration phase, and then the voter anonymously
sends his vote along with the credential during a casting phase,
then the attacker may be able to link the vote to the voter.
As noted before, diff-equivalence (as an under-approximation
of behavioural equivalence) is rarely appropriate to directly
verify ballot secrecy [14], [16]. An underlying reason for this
is that considering diff-equivalence gives the attacker more
additional structural links than when considering the intended
behavioural equivalence. This often leads to spurious attacks.
b) Informal Presentation of the Conditions: We analysed
typical attacks and the underlying links. We classified them
and identified three classes of links leading to privacy breaches.
The purpose of each of our conditions is to guarantee the
absence of links from the corresponding class. Our Main
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Theorem states that together, the three conditions suffice to
ensure ballot secrecy.
(Dishonest Condition) By adopting a malicious behaviour, the
attacker may be able to link messages that would not be link-
able in the intended, honest execution. For instance, if the at-
tacker sends tampered data to a voter, the attacker may be able
to later observe the tampered part in different messages, and
conclude that it comes from the same voter, which allows the
attacker to establish possibly harmful links. Our first condition
essentially requires that a voting system is indistinguishable for
the attacker from a voting system in which at the beginning of
each phase, all agents forget everything about the past phases
and pretend that everything happened as expected, i.e., as in
an honest execution. The previous example would violate the
condition, because in the second system, the attacker would
not be able to observe the tainted data. Interestingly, this
condition is mostly a reachability property that does not suffer
from the lack of precision of diff-equivalence.
(Honest Relations Condition) Even in the expected honest exe-
cution, the attacker may be able to exploit useful links. Thanks
to the previous condition, we can focus on a system where
each role is split into sub-roles for each phase. This allows
us to verify the absence of the former relations using diff-
equivalence, without giving the attacker spurious structural
links, as mentioned above.
(Tally Condition) We take into account the tally outcome,
which enables establishing more links. Typically, the attacker
may link an identity to a vote if it can forge valid ballots
related to (i.e., containing the same vote) data that can be
linked to an identity. This introduces a bias in the tally
outcome that can reveal the vote in the forged ballot. This
attack class strictly extends ballot independence attacks [3].
The Tally Condition requires that when a valid ballot was
forged by the attacker then it must have been forged without
meaningfully using voter’s data already linked to an identity.
III. MODEL
We model security protocols using the standard process
algebra in the style of the dialect of Blanchet et al. [27]
(used in the ProVerif tool), that is inspired by the applied
π-calculus [28]. Participants are modelled as processes, and
the exchanged messages are modelled using a term algebra.
Since most of the e-voting protocols are structured in
a sequence of phases (e.g.registration phase, voting phase,
tallying phase), our model includes explicit phases. We briefly
present this model in this section; a detailed presentation can
be found in Appendix A.
a) Term algebra: We use a term algebra to model messages
built and manipulated using various cryptographic primitives.
We assume an infinite set N of names, used to represent
keys and nonces; and two infinite and disjoint sets of vari-
ables X (to refer to unknown parts of messages expected by
participants) and W (called handles, used to store messages
learned by the attacker). We consider a signature Σ (i.e. a
set of function symbols with their arity). Σ is the union
of two disjoint sets: the constructor Σc and destructor Σd
P,Q := 0 null
| in(c, x).P input
| out(c, u).P output
| let x = v in P else Q evaluation
| P | Q parallel
| νn.P restriction
| !P replication
| i : P phase
where c ∈ C, x ∈ X , n ∈ N , u ∈ T (Σc,N ∪ X ), i ∈ N, and
v ∈ T (Σ,N ∪ X ).
Fig. 1. Syntax of processes
symbols. Given a signature F , and a set of atoms A, we denote
by T (F ,A) the set of terms built using atoms from A and
function symbols from F . The terms in T (Σc,N ) are called
messages. Sequences of elements are shown bold (e.g. x,n).
The application of a substitution σ to a term u is written uσ,
and dom(σ) denotes its domain.
As in the process calculus presented in [27], messages
are subject to an equational theory used for for modelling
algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives. Formally, we
consider a congruence =E on T (Σc,N ∪X ), generated from
a set of equations E over T (Σc,X ). We say that a function
symbol is free when it does not occur in E. We assume the
existence of a computation relation ↓: T (Σ,N ) × T (Σc,N )
that gives a meaning to destructor symbols. In Appendix A2
we describe how this relation can be obtained from rewriting
systems and give a full example. For modelling purposes, we
also split the signature Σ into two parts, namely Σpub (public
function symbols, known by the attacker) and Σpriv (private
function symbols). An attacker builds his own messages by
applying public function symbols to terms he already knows
and that are available through variables in W . Formally, a
computation done by the attacker is a recipe (noted R), i.e., a
term in T (Σpub,W).
Example 1. Consider the signature
Σc = {eq, 〈 〉, sign, pkv, blind, unblind, commit, ok}
Σd = {verSign, open, π1, π2, eq}.
The symbols eq, 〈〉, sign, verSign, blind, unblind, commit
and open have arity 2 and represent equality test, pairing,
signature, signature verification, blind signature, unblind,
commitment and commitment opening. The symbols π1, π2
and pkv have arity 1 and represent projections and the agents’
verification keys. Finally, ok is a constant symbol (i.e. arity
0). To reflect the algebraic properties of the blind signature,
we may consider =E generated by the following equations:
unblind(sign(blind(xm, y), zk), y) = sign(xm, zk)
unblind(blind(xm, y), y) = xm.
Symbols in Σd can be given a semantics through the following
rewriting rules: verSign(sign(xm, zk), pkv(zk)) → xm,
open(commit(xm, y), y) → xm, πi(〈x1, x2〉) → xi,
eq(x, x)→ok.
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b) Process algebra: We assume Cpub and Cpriv are dis-
joint sets of public and private channel names and note
C = Cpub ∪ Cpriv. Protocols are specified using the syntax in
Figure 1. Most of the constructions are standard. The construct
let x = v in P else Q tries to evaluate the term v and
in case of success, i.e. when v ↓ u for some message u,
the process P in which x is substituted by u is executed;
otherwise the process Q is executed. Note also that the let
instruction together with the eq theory (see Example 1) can
encode the usual conditional construction. The replication !P
behaves like an infinite parallel composition P |P |P | . . .. The
construct i : P indicates that the process P may only be
executed when the current phase is i. The construct νn.P
allows to create a new, fresh name n; it binds n in P which
is subject to α-renaming. For a sequence of names n, we may
note νn.P to denote the sequence of creation of names in n
followed by P . For brevity, we sometimes omit “else 0” and
null processes at the end of processes. A process P is ground
if it has no free variable (i.e., a variable not in the scope of
an input or a let construct). A process is guarded if it is of
the form i : P .
The operational semantics of processes is given by a labelled
transition system over configurations (denoted by K) (P ;φ; i)
made of a multiset P of guarded ground processes, i ∈ N
the current phase, and a frame φ = {wj 7→ uj}j∈J (i.e.
a substitution where ∀j ∈ J , wj ∈ W , uj ∈ T (Σc,N )).
The frame φ represents the messages known to the attacker.
Given a configuration K , φ(K) denotes its frame. We often
write P ∪ P instead of {P} ∪ P and implicitly remove null
processes from configurations.
The operational semantics of a process is given by the
relation α−→ defined as the least relation over configurations
satisfying the rules in Figure 2. For all constructs, phases
are just handed over to continuation processes. The rules are
quite standard and correspond to the intuitive meaning of the
syntax given above. The rules IN,OUT,NEXT are the only
rules that produce observable actions (i.e., non τ -actions). The
relation α1...αn−−−−−→ between configurations (where αi are actions)
is defined as the transitive closure of α−→.
Example 2. We use the FOO protocol [29] (modelled as
in [16]) as a running example. FOO involves voters and a
registrar role. In the first phase, a voter commits and then
blinds its vote and sends this blinded commit signed with his
own signing key key(id) to the registrar. The function symbol
key(·) is a free private function symbol associating a secret key
to each identity. The registrar then blindly signs the committed
vote with his own signing key kR ∈ Σc∩Σpriv and sends this to
the voter. In the voting phase, voters anonymously output their
committed vote signed by the registrar and, on request, anony-
mously send the opening for their committed vote. The process
corresponding to a voter session (depending on some constants
id, v) is depicted below, where c ∈ Cpub, M = commit(v, k),
e = blind(M,k′) and s = sign(e, key(id)):
V (id, v) = 1 : νk.νk′.out(c, 〈pk(key(id)); s〉).in(c, x).
if verSign(x, pk(kR)) = e
then 2 : out(c, unblind(x, k′)).in(c, y).
if y = 〈y1;M〉
then out(c, 〈y1, 〈M,k〉〉)
A configuration corresponding to a voter A ready to vote v1
with an environment knowing the registrar’s key is K1 =
({V (A, v1)}; {wR 7→ kR}; 1). It notably has an execution
K1
trh−−→(∅;φ; 2), where:
trh = τ.τ.out(c, w1).in(c, R).τthen.τ.phase(2).
out(c, w2).in(c, 〈C,w2〉).τthen.out(c, w3)
and where C is any constant in Σc ∩ Σpub, φ =
{wR 7→ kR, w1 7→ 〈pk(kid), s〉, w2 7→ sign(M,kR), w3 7→
〈n;M ; k〉}, s,M are as specified above and R =
sign(verSign(π2(w1), π1(w1)), wR). This corresponds to a nor-
mal, expected execution of one protocol session.
c) Discussion on Phases: Our notion of phases, also
known as stages or weak phase [26], [27], faithfully model
the notion of phases with deadlines in the context of e-voting
protocols. Once the deadline of a phase i has passed (i.e.
the action phase(j) has been triggered for j > i) then, no
remaining actions from phase i can be executed. It also can be
modelled in ProVerif (see [15], [26], [27], [30]). Note that in
the literature, phases are often modelled with synchronisation
barriers [16], [26] (also called strong phases). The latter
are a much stronger notion of phases that require all initial
processes to reach the next phase before the system can
progress to the next phase (i.e., no processes can be dropped).
In our view, synchronisation barriers model phases in e-voting
protocols less faithfully than our (weak) phases, and come
with limitations that we discuss in Section IV-B. We note that
stages can be combined with replication without restriction
while strong phases cannot be put under replication [16], [30].
d) Trace equivalence: Trace equivalence is commonly
used [14] to express many privacy-type properties such
as ballot secrecy. Intuitively, two configurations are trace
equivalent if an attacker cannot tell whether he is interacting
with one or the other. Such a definition is based on a
notion of indistinguishability between frames, called static
equivalence. Intuitively, two frames are statically equivalent,
if there is no computation (nor equality test) that succeeds in
one frame and fails in the other one. Then, trace equivalence
is the active counterpart taking into account the fact that the
attacker may interfere during the execution of the process in
order to distinguish between the two situations. We define
obs(tr) to be the subsequence of tr obtained by erasing all the
τ, τthen, τelse actions. Intuitively, trace equivalence holds when
any execution of one configuration can be mimicked by an
execution of the other configuration having same observable
actions and leading to statically equivalent frames. We give
a formal definition in Appendix C.
Example 3. Consider the frame φ from Example 2. The fact
that the attacker cannot statically distinguish the resulting
frame from a frame obtained after the same execution but
starting with V (A, v2) instead of V (A, v1) is modelled by
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IN (i : in(c, x).P ∪ P ;φ; i) in(c,R)−−−−→ (i : P{x 7→ u} ∪ P ;φ; i)
with c ∈ Cpub where R is a recipe such that Rφ↓u for some message u
OUT (i : out(c, u).P ∪ P ;φ; i) out(c,w)−−−−−→ (i : P ∪ P ;φ ∪ {w 7→u}; i)
with c ∈ Cpub and w a fresh variable in W
COM (i : in(c, x).P ∪ i : out(c, u).Q ∪ P ;φ; i) τ−→ (i : P{x 7→ u} ∪ i : Q ∪ P ;φ; i)
with c ∈ Cpriv
LET (i : let x = v in P else Q ∪ P ;φ; i) τthen−−→ (i : P{x 7→ u} ∪ P ;φ; i)
when v↓u for some u
LET-FAIL (i : let x = v in P else Q ∪ P ;φ; i) τelse−−→ (i : Q ∪ P ;φ; i) when v 8
NEW (i : νn.P ∪ P ;φ; i) τ−→ (i : P ∪ P ;φ; i) where n is a fresh name from N
NEXT (P ;φ; i) phase(j)−−−−−→ (P ;φ; j) for some j ∈ N such that j > i
PAR ({i : (P1 | P2)} ∪ P ;φ; i)
τ
−→ ({i : P1, i : P2} ∪ P ;φ; i)
PHASE (i : j : P ∪ P ;φ; i) τ−→ (j : P ∪ P ;φ; i) REPL (i : !P ∪ P ;φ; i)
τ
−→ (i : P ∪ i : !P ∪ P ;φ; i)
Fig. 2. Semantics for processes
the following static equivalence: φ ∼? φ′ where φ′ =
φ{v1 7→v2} which in fact does not hold (see witness given in
Appendix A2). Consider Ki = ({V (A, vi)}; {wR 7→ kR}; 1)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. We may be interested whether K1 ≈? K2.
This equivalence does not hold because there is only one
execution starting with K1 (resp. K2) following the trace
obs(trh) (see Example 2) and the resulting frame is φ (resp.
φ′). But, as shown above, φ 6∼ φ′. Therefore, K1 6≈ K2.
However, ballot secrecy is not defined by such an equivalence
(see Section IV-B) and we will see that the FOO protocol
actually satisfies it.
e) Diff-Equivalence: Trace equivalence is hard to verify,
in particular because of its forall-exists structure: for any
execution on one side, one has to find a matching execu-
tion on the other side. One approach is to consider under-
approximations of trace equivalence by over-approximating
the attacker’s capabilities. Diff-equivalence is such an under-
approximation. It was originally introduced to enable ProVerif
to analyse some form of behavioural equivalence, and was later
also implemented in Tamarin and Maude-NPA.
Such a notion is defined on bi-processes, which are pairs
of processes with the same structure that only differ in the
terms they use. The syntax is similar to above, but each term
u has to be replaced by a bi-term written choice[u1, u2] (using
ProVerif syntax). Given a bi-process P , the process fst(P ) is
obtained by replacing all occurrences of choice[u1, u2] with
u1; similarly with snd(P ). The semantics of bi-processes is
defined as expected via a relation that expresses when and
how a bi-configuration may evolve. A bi-process reduces if,
and only if, both sides of the bi-process reduce in the same
way triggering the same rule: e.g., a conditional has to be
evaluated in the same way on both sides. The relation tr−→bi
on bi-processes is therefore defined as for processes. Finally,
diff-equivalence of a biprocess intuitively holds when for any
execution, the resulting frames on both sides are statically
equivalent and resulting configurations on both sides are able
to perform the same kind of actions. A formal definition is
given in Appendix D.
As expected, this notion of diff-equivalence is stronger than
trace equivalence. It may be the case that the two sides
of the bi-process reduce in different ways (e.g., taking two
different branches in a conditional) but still produce the same
observable actions. Phrased differently: diff-equivalence gives
the attacker the ability to see not only the observable actions,
but also the processes’ structures. This strong notion of diff-
equivalence is sufficient to establish some properties but is too
strong to be useful for establishing ballot secrecy off-the-shelf
(we discuss this at greater length in Section VII).
IV. FRAMEWORK
In this section we present our framework that we need
to establish our results, including definitions for e-voting
protocols and ballot secrecy.
a) Preliminaries: We first define symbolic traces which
are traces whose recipes are symbolic; i.e., they are from
T (Σpub,W∪ξ), where ξ is a new set of second-order variables.
Intuitively, a symbolic recipe is a partial computation con-
taining unknown parts symbolised by second-order variables.
Symbolic traces represent attacker behaviours with non-fully
specified recipes. A symbolic trace can be instantiated to a con-
crete trace by replacing the second-order variables by recipes
(i.e., in T (Σpub,W)). To an honest trace th, we associate a
distinguished instantiation called the idealised trace of th that
can be obtained from th by replacing each variable Y ∈ ξ by
a fixed free, public constant CY that we add to Σc ∩ Σpub.
Example 4 (Resuming Example 2). The recipe of the last
input of trh 〈C,w2〉 could be replaced by the symbolic recipe
〈X,w2〉 with X ∈ ξ (i.e., reflecting that the choice of C is
unimportant) resulting in a symbolic trace th. The idealised
trace is th{X 7→ CX}, where CX ∈ Σc ∩Σpub.
A. Class of e-voting protocols
We explain in this section how we model e-voting protocols
and the considered scenarios. Essentially, we may consider
an arbitrary number of honest voters plus all necessary
authorities (e.g., ballot box, registrar, tally), which can
perform an unbounded number of sessions. Depending on
the threat model, we also consider an arbitrary number of
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dishonest voters. We use role to refer to a specific role of the
protocol, such as voter, authority, etc. Together, the agents
performing the roles are able to produce a public bulletin
board of ballots from which the tally computes the final result
(i.e., multisets of accepted votes).
First, the protocol should specify a fixed finite set of possible
votes as a set of free, public constants V (e.g., V = {yes, no}
for a referendum). We also distinguish a specific free, public
constant ⊥ modelling the result of an invalid ballot.
a) Roles: E-voting protocols specify a process for each
honest role (in particular, the voter role). Dishonest roles can
be left unspecified because they will be played by the envi-
ronment. Those processes may use e.g. phases, private data,
private channels but no replication nor parallel composition,
as a role specifies how a single agent behaves during one
session.
Definition 1. An honest role is specified by a process of
the form i : νn.A, where A is a process without parallel
composition, replication nor creation of names. There should
be at least a process for the voter role and one for the
ballot box role (noted Ab). Moreover, for the specific case of
voter role, the corresponding process noted V (id, v) should be
parameterized by id (modelling an identity) and v (modelling
the vote this voter is willing to cast). Finally, initial attacker’s
knowledge is specified through a frame φ0.
The process Ab shall contain (at least) one output on the
distinguished public channel cb ∈ Cpub. Intuitively, each
session of the ballot box processes input data and may output
a ballot on channel cb (this may depend on private checks).
We eventually define the bulletin board itself as the set of
messages output on channel cb. W.l.o.g., we assume that role
processes do not feature creation of names, since one can
always create the required names at the top level.
In threat models with dishonest voters, honest voters are
played by the environment and we let RV = ∅. If the con-
sidered threat model does not consider dishonest voters, then
the honest voters cannot be played by the environment. For
such threat models, we model honest voters explicitly using the
following set of processes: RV = {νid. νn V (id, v) | v ∈ V},
where n are all the free names in V (id, v). We write Ro for
the set of all processes of honest roles except the voter role
and let R be the set RV ∪Ro.
Example 5. The process V (v, id) defined in Example 2 is the
voter role one could define for the FOO protocol. We consider
the ballot box as untrusted, and we therefore model it by the
process Ab = 2 : in(u, x).out(cb, x), where u ∈ Cpub. In
contrast, we leave the registrar unspecified for the moment
because we consider it corrupted and thus played by the envi-
ronment.We thus have RV = ∅ and R = Ro = {Ab}. Finally,
the initial frame contains the registrar’s key: φ0 = {w0 7→kR}.
b) Bulletin Board & Tally: We assume a public test Ψb
that everyone can execute on the bulletin board to know if a
ballot is well-formed or not. Formally Ψb[] is a term with a
hole. For instance, Ψb can be a combination of a signature
and ZK proof verification. The protocol should also specify
a term with hole Extract[] that models the extraction of the
vote from a valid ballot. As defined below, we require that this
operator only computes votes or ⊥.
Definition 2. The bulletin board and the tally are speci-
fied through a public term Ψb[] ∈ T (Σpub, []) and a term
Extract[] ∈ T (Σ, []) such that: for any message t, it holds
that Extract[t]↓u for some u ∈ V ∪ {⊥}.
Given a trace tr and a frame φ, we define respectively the
bulletin board and the tally’s outcome:
BB(tr, φ) = {wφ | ∃out(cb, w) ∈ tr, Ψb[wφ]↓}
#
Res(tr, φ) = {v | ∃ba ∈ BB(tr, φ),Extract(ba)↓v ∈ V}#.
The bulletin board is the multiset of messages that pass the
Ψb condition and channel cb. Then, the tally’s outcome is
the multiset of votes obtained by applying Extract(·) on the
bulletin board. While our notion of tally seems very restrictive,
note that many operations can be performed by roles (e.g. Ab)
such as mixnets as done e.g. in [16] where the shuffling is
done between two phases.
Example 6 (Continuing Example 5). The public test Ψb is
defined as the following term with hole:
Ψb[] = and(verSign(pi1(pi2([])), pk(skR)),
open(getMess(pi1(pi2([]))), pi2(pi2([]))))
where the destructor and is such that and(t1, t2)↓
if and only if t1↓ and t2↓ (formal definition in
Appendix A2). Indeed, expected ballots are of the form
〈X, 〈sign(commit(k, v), kR), k〉〉. The evaluation of Ψb[b]
may fail if either the signature verification fails or the commit
opening fails. Finally, the extraction function is Extract[] =
wrapVote(open(getMess(π2(π1([]))), π2(π2([])))) where
wrapVote(·) corresponds to the identity function on V and
maps all values not in V (modulo =E) to ⊥.
c) Honest Trace: As said before, no process is given for
dishonest roles. However, we require a notion of honest trace
that itself specifies what behaviour should be expected from
dishonest roles.
Definition 3. The protocol shall specify a symbolic trace th =
th0.out(cb, wb) (i.e., the last action corresponds to the casting
of a ballot) and a distinguished execution, called the honest
execution, of the form: ({V (id, v)}⊎Ro;φ0; 1)
trh−−→(P ;φh; kf )
for some v ∈ V and a free constant id, with trh the idealised
trace associated to th. Additionally, we assume that th contains
the action phase(k) for all 2 ≤ k ≤ kf (no phase is skipped).
The honest trace describes the honest expected execution of
one voter completing the voting process until casting a ballot
possibly through an interaction with different roles. Here, the
notion captures the fact that some corrupted roles are played by
the attacker. Hence the fact that the honest trace is a symbolic
trace with sub-messages that are unknown and not specified
because chosen by the attacker. Note that the honest trace
specifies how conditionals are expected to evaluate thanks to
the τthen/τelse dichotomy.
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Example 7 (Resuming Example 5). We consider the following
extension of the symbolic trace described in Example 4, where
X ∈ ξ and R1 = sign(verSign(π2(w1), π1(w1)), wR):
th = τ.τ.out(c, w1).in(c,R1).τthen.τ.phase(2).out(c, w2).
in(c, 〈X,w2〉).τthen.out(c, w3).τ.in(u,w3).out(cb, w3)
Definition 4 (E-voting Protocols). An e-voting protocol
is given by a tuple (V ;φ0;V (id, v);R; (Ψb[],Extract[]); th)
where V are the allowed votes (i.e. free, public constants),
V (id, V ) and R are the processes modelling honest roles and
φ0 is the attacker’s initial knowledge as in Definition 1, Ψb[]
and Extract[] model the bulletin board and the tally as in
Definition 2, and th describes the intended, honest execution
as in Definition 3.
d) Flexible threat models: Our generic definition of
e-voting protocols allows to model many different threat
models. First, the processes that model roles may use different
kinds of channels. For instance, by using private channels for
some inputs and outputs, we model communication channels
that prevent the attacker to eavesdrop on or tamper with
those exchanged messages. By using public channels and
adding the identity of voter in exchanged data, we model
an insecure, non-anonymous communication channel. In
contrast, by using only a single public channel, we model an
anonymous communication channel, since all voters will use
the same channel. Moreover, some roles can be considered
dishonest or honest yielding different threat models. Finally,
different frames φ0 allow modelling different initial attacker
knowledge (e.g., secret keys of some roles).
e) Annotated Processes: Finally, we equip the semantics
with annotations that will help subsequent developments. We
assume a notion of annotations over processes so that we
can keep track of role sessions and specific voters throughout
executions. Each action can then be labelled by this infor-
mation. For a voter process V (id, v), we note [id, v] the
annotation given to actions produced by this process. Formally
we may define such annotations by giving explicit annotations
to processes in the initial multiset and modify the semantics
so that it keeps annotations on processes as one could expect.
Those notations notably allow to define when a specific voter
casts a ballot as shown next.
Definition 5. Consider an e-voting protocol
(V ;φ0;V (id, v);R; (Ψb[],Extract[]); th). We say that
a voter V (id, v) casts a ballot w in an execution
(P ⊎ {V (id, v), !Ab};φ0; 1) tr−→K when there exists an
output out(c, wb) ∈ tr annotated [id, v] and a ballot box (i.e.
Ab) session sb such that actions from tr annotated sb are
in(c, w′b), out(cb, w) such that wbφ(K) =E w
′
bφ(K). We
say that V (id, v) casts a valid ballot w when, in addition,
Ψb[wφ(K)]↓ .
B. Ballot Secrecy
Next, we define the notion of ballot secrecy that we aim
to analyse. Intuitively, ballot secrecy holds when the attacker
is not able to observe any difference between two situations
where voters are wiling to cast different votes. However, we
cannot achieve such a property by modifying just one vote,
since the attacker will always be able to observe the difference
on the final tally outcome. Example 3 illustrates this problem:
one has that K1 6≈ K2 while the FOO protocol actually en-
sures ballot secrecy. Instead, we shall consider a swap of votes
that preserves the tally’s outcome as usually done [24], [25].
More formally, we are interested in comparing S = (! R) ⊎
{V (A, v0), V (B, v1)} and Sr = (! R)⊎{V (A, v1), V (B, v0)},
where v0, v1 are two distinct votes in V and A,B are two dis-
tinct free, public constants, and, !Q refers to {!P | P ∈ Q}#
for a multiset of processes Q. Because the attacker should
neither be able to distinguish S and Sr when having access
to the tally’s outcome, we are actually interested in the trace
equivalence between S ∪{Tally} and Sr ∪{Tally} where the
Tally is a process computing the e-voting protocol’s outcome;
e.g. Tally =!in(cb, x).let z = Ψb[x] in out(c,Extract(x)).
This is the most well-established definition of ballot secrecy
in symbolic model introduced in [25].
However, many e-voting protocols in our class would not
satisfy such a property because the attacker may force1 a partic-
ular voter (e.g. A) to not cast any ballot in order to infer, from
the tally’s outcome, the vote that the other voter (e.g. B) has
cast. This is well-known and usually addressed by modelling
phases as synchronisation barriers as already acknowledged
in [25]: “when we omit the synchronization [...] privacy is
violated.” With such synchronisation barriers, all participants
shall reach the same barrier in order to move to the next phase
preventing the previous scenario from happening. However,
the use of barriers (as done e.g. in [16], [18], [24]–[26]) also
limits the range of e-voting protocols one can model and anal-
yse. For instance, no synchronisation barrier can be put under a
replication, which forbids modelling authorities that act during
several phases or threat models with no dishonest voter.
In contrast, we choose to model e-voting phases as weak
phases to avoid those limitations and thus need an extra
assumption as a counterpart to synchronisation barriers. We
shall restrict our analysis to fair executions2 where, at each
beginning of phase, the voter A and B are still present and A
casts a ballot, if and only if, B does so. Note that all execu-
tions of protocols modelled with synchronisation barriers are
necessarily fair. We are thus conservative over prior definitions.
Our fairness assumption can also be seen as an extension of
the tally’s assumption in [17] that process the bulletin boards
only if they contain both Alice and Bob’s ballots.
Definition 6. Consider an e-voting protocol
(V ;φ0;V (id, v);R; (Ψb[],Extract[]); th). An execution
(P ;φ0; 1) tr−→K for P ∈ {S,Sr} is said to be fair for voter
[id, v] when at each beginning of phase i, there is a a process
annotated [id, v] at phase i. Such an execution is said to be fair
1This attack is captured by the model but is unrealistic in practice. Indeed,
in practical scenarios, to break the ballot secrecy of a particular voter, it would
require the attacker to prevent all other voters from casting a vote or, in case
of dishonest tally, from performing their individual verifiability checks (as
observed in [4]).
2This should not be confused with the fairness property [3], [17] that is
one of the security property often required from e-voting protocols.
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when, for some v, v′ ∈ V , (i) it is fair for [A, v] and [B, v′]
and (ii) [A, v] casts a ballot if, and only if, so does [B, v′].
Finally, we give below the definition of ballot secrecy. We
could have defined it as the trace equivalence (by symmetry)
between S ∪{Tally} and Sr ∪{Tally} with a restriction over
the explored traces (i.e. the ones that are fair) but we prefer our
equivalent formulation in the interest of clarity. Note that the
fairness assumptions get rid of strictly less behaviours than the
use of synchronisation barriers, and are therefore more precise
from that point of view.
Definition 7 (Ballot Secrecy). An e-voting protocol
(V ;φ0;V (id, v);R; (Ψb[],Extract[]); th) ensures ballot se-
crecy when for any fair execution (S;φ0; 1)
tr
−→K , there exists
a fair execution (Sr;φ0; 1) tr
′
−→Kr such that:
• the attacker observes the same actions: obs(tr) =
obs(tr′);
• the attacker observes the same data: φ(K) ∼ φ(Kr);
• the attacker observes the same tally outcome:
Res(tr, φ(K)) = Res(tr′, φ(Kr)).
V. CONDITIONS
We introduce three conditions and prove that together, they
imply ballot secrecy. In Section V-A we provide intuition for
our approach and formally define the support notions. We then
define the conditions (i.e., Dishonest, Honest Relations, Tally
Condition) in sections V-B to V-D. We state in Section V-E
that our conditions are sufficient.
A. Protocol phases and their links
a) Identity-leaking vs. Vote-leaking Phases: In a nutshell,
ballot secrecy boils down to the absence of link between an
identity and the vote this identity is willing to cast. However,
as illustrated by the next example, the attacker is able to
link different actions performed by the same voter as long
as they take part in the same phase. Thus, each phase of the
e-voting protocol must hide and protect either the identity of
voters or the votes voters are willing to cast. It is thus natural
to associate to each phase, a leaking label: either the phase
(possibly) leaks identity (we call such phases id-leaking) or
it (possibly) leaks vote (we call such phases vote-leaking). In
order to ensure ballot secrecy, the Honest Relations Condition,
which we define later, will enforce that the attacker cannot
establish meaningful links (i.e. links that would hold for S but
not for Sr) between id-leaking phase outputs and vote-leaking
phase outputs.
Example 8. Consider a voter’s role process V (id, v) =
1 : out(a, id).out(a, v) (other components are unimportant
here). This trivial protocol is an abstraction of a registration
phase (voter sends its identity) followed by a voting phase
(voter sends its vote). We show this does not ensure ballot
secrecy (see also the full witness in Appendix E). Consider the
(fair) execution starting with (S; ∅; 1) and producing the trace
tr = out(a, wid).out(a, wv).out(a, w
′
id).out(a, w
′
v) whose
the two first (resp. two last) actions are performed by the
voter A (resp. B). This execution has no indistinguishable
counterpart in Sr. Indeed, because the first message reveals
the identity of the voter, the attacker can test that the first
output is performed by A. After the first output A, the Sr side
can only output either B or v1 but not v0. However, because
the second message reveals the vote, the attacker can make
sure the output vote is v0 and not v1. Thus, this protocol does
not ensure ballot secrecy because in a single phase (i.e., phase
1), there is one output revealing the identity of the voter and
one output revealing the voter’s vote. However, the process
V (id, v) = 1 : out(a, id). 2 : out(a, v) ensures ballot secrecy
and does not suffer from the above problem. The attacker
cannot force A to execute its first message leaking identity and
then immediately its second message leaking its vote, because
doing so would kill the process V (B, v1) (which is still in
phase 1) preventing the whole execution from being fair. Thus,
the attacker has to trigger all possible first-phase actions of A
and B before moving to the second phase. After the first phase,
we end up with the processes {out(a, v0), out(a, v1)} on the
S side and {out(a, v1), out(a, v0)} on the Sr side, which are
indistinguishable.
Thus, in this first iteration, we split outputs revealing identity
and outputs revealing votes in distinct phases. This enables
breaking links between identity and vote.
As we will later see, our approach requires that we associate
a leaking label to each phase which is a binary label indicating
whether we consider the phase to be vote-leaking or id-
leaking. Our only goal is not find such a labelling for which
our conditions hold, implying ballot secrecy. In practice and
on a case-by-case basis, we can immediately associate the
appropriate leaking label to a phase. However, we explain in
Section VI-A how those labels can be automatically guessed.
Example 9 (Continuing Example 7). We consider phase 1
(resp. phase 2) as id-leaking (resp. vote-leaking).
b) Id-leaking vs. Vote-leaking Names: As illustrated by
the next example, a name presents in different outputs can also
be exploited to link those outputs. This is problematic when
phases of those outputs have different leaking labels since it
would enable linking those phases and thus maybe an identity
with a vote. That is why, similarly to phases, we associate
a leaking label to each name created by role processes. Note
that the phase in which the name is created is irrelevant. What
really matters is where the name is used and to what kind
of data it can be linked. Again this classification is easily
done on a case-by-case basis in practice but we present simple
heuristics to automatically infer it in Section VI-A.
Example 10. We continue Example 8 and consider V (id, v) =
1 : νr.out(a, id ⊕ r).2 : out(a, v ⊕ r) where ⊕ denotes the
exclusive or operator. This new protocol seems similar to the
previous iteration. However, it does not satisfy ballot secrecy.
Now, the attacker can use the name r to link the action of the
id-leaking phase with the action of the vote-leaking phase (see
witness in Example 14), defeating the role of the phase which
previously broke this link. Note that only names can lead to
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the this issue: all other kinds of data (e.g., public constants) are
uniform and do not depend on a specific voter session (e.g.,
replace r by a constant ok ∈ Σc and the resulting protocol
ensures ballot secrecy).
Example 11 (Continuing Example 9). We consider the names
k, k′ (created by the voter as shown in Example 2) to be vote-
leaking.
c) “Divide & Conquer”: One reason that ballot secrecy
is hard to verify using existing techniques, is the fact that
diff-equivalence is too rigid w.r.t. phases: it does not allow
any flexibility at the beginning of phases. We should be able
to stop there, and start again with a new pairing left-right,
a new biprocess3. A core ingredient of our technique is to
split each role into independent, standalone sub-roles (each
sub-role playing one phase of the initial role), which allows
us to consider many more pairings including ones (left-right)
that are not consistent over phases. One of our conditions
will require that the attacker cannot distinguish the voter and
other roles processes from standalone sub-role processes that
do not need to know the execution of past phases. This is
also important to ensure ballot secrecy, because otherwise the
attacker might link two actions coming from two different
phases and then learn that they came from the same voter.
We now formally define the sub-roles. Let nvi be the vector
made of the constant vi and all vote-leaking names (with
indices i). Let nidi be the vector made of the constant idi and
all id-leaking names (with indices i). The pair (nvi ,n
id
j ) (deter-
ministically) describes the initial data needed to start one full
honest interaction of one voter with all necessary role sessions.
Definition 8. Recall that the voter process is of the form
V (id, v) = k : νn.V ′(id, v) where V ′ is without creation of
names. We define V (nidi ,n
v
j ) as the process k : V
′(idi, vj)σ
where σ maps names in n to corresponding names in nvi ∪n
id
j .
We similarly define A(nidi ,n
v
j ) for A ∈ Ro. Finally, we define
Ro(nidi ,n
v
j ) = {A(n
id
i ,n
v
j ) | A ∈ Ro}
#.
Example 12 (Resuming Example 10). Assuming r is said to
be vote-leaking, one has nidi = idi and n
v
j = vj , rj , and,
V (nidi ,n
v
j ) = 1 : out(a, idi ⊕ rj).2 : out(a, vj ⊕ rj)
Intuitively, the process V (nidi ,n
v
j ) corresponds to the voter
role process of identity idi and vote vi that will use all
given names instead of creating fresh ones. Similarly for
authorities. Note that in the vectors nidi ,n
v
j , there may be
names that are never used in some roles; we still give the
full vectors as arguments though. We remark that given
names nvi ,n
id
j , there is a unique (modulo =E) execution of
({V (nidi ,n
v
j )} ⊎ Ro(n
id
i ,n
v
j );φ0; 1) following the idealised
trace that is (up to some τ -actions) the bijective renaming
of the honest execution (see Definition 3) from names used
in the honest execution to names in nvi ,n
id
j . We call that
execution the idealised execution for nvi ,n
id
j .
3We would like to achieve this even for roles that can perform an unbounded
number of sessions.
Definition 9 (Phase Roles). Given nvi ,n
id
j , consider the
unique idealised execution for nvi ,n
id
j : ({V (n
id
i ,n
v
j )} ⊎
Ro(nidi ,n
v
j );φ0; 1)
trh
−−→(∅;φ;n). For some A(n
id
i ,n
v
j ) ∈
R(nidi ,n
v
j ) and some phase number k ∈ [1;n], we note
Akf (n
id
i ,n
v
j ) the first process resulting from A(n
id
i ,n
v
j ) of the
form k : P for some P if it exists; and 0 otherwise. Finally, the
phase role of A for k, noted Ak(nidi ,n
v
j ), is the process one
obtains from Akf (n
id
i ,n
v
j ) by replacing by 0 each sub-process
of the form l : P ′ for some P ′ and l > k. Further, the process
A∀(nidi ,n
v
j ) is the sequential composition of all A
i(nidi ,n
v
j ).
Finally, V k(nidi ,n
v
j ) and V
∀(nidi ,n
v
j ) are defined similarly.
In a nutshell, phase roles describe how roles behave in each
phase, assuming that previous phases followed the idealised
executions for the given names. A crucial property we
eventually deduce from our conditions is that it is sufficient
(i.e., we do not lose behaviours and hence neither attacks)
to analyse the phase roles in parallel instead of the whole
e-voting system. Note that, by doing so, we do not only put
processes in parallel that were in sequence, we also make
them forget the execution of past phases cutting out some
potential links that rely on that aspect. Indeed, the voter
process in a phase i may use data received in a phase j < i
creating links between those two (e.g. via malicious tainted
data). When put in parallel, all parts are standalone processes
that are no longer linked by past execution. Note also that we
put standalone processes in parallel that behave as if previous
phases followed one specific instantiation of the honest
trace (i.e., the idealised trace) thus reducing a lot possible
behaviours. This will be crucial for defining Honest Relations
Condition via biprocesses that could not be defined otherwise.
Definition 10. The id-leaking sub-roles (respectively vote-
leaking sub-roles) are as follow:
Rid(nidi ,n
v
j ) = {A
k(nidi ,n
v
j ) | A ∈ Ro ∪ {V }, k id-leak.}
Rv(nidi ,n
v
j ) = {A
k(nidi ,n
v
j ) | A ∈ Ro ∪ {V }, k vote-leak.}
Example 13 (Continuing Example 11). The phase roles are:
V 1(nidid ,n
v
i ) = 1 : M = commit(vi, ki),
e = blind(M,k′i), s = sign(e, key(id)),
out(c, 〈pk(key(id)); s〉). in(c, x);
if verSign(x, pk(kR)) = e then 0
V 2(nidid ,n
v
i ) = 2 : M = commit(vi, ki),
out(c, sign(M,kR)). in(c, y).
if y = 〈y1;M〉 then out(c, 〈y1, 〈M,ki〉〉
The sub-roles are Rid = {V 1}, Rv = {V 2, Ab}.
d) Honest Interactions: We will show that under our
conditions, S is indistinguishable from an e-voting system
based on the reunion of id-leaking and vote-leaking sub-roles.
To achieve this property we eventually require that when a
voter reaches a phase k then it must be the case that it had an
honest interaction so far. This notion of honest interaction is
captured by the honest trace th as formally defined next.
For two traces tr1, tr2 and a frame φ, we note tr1 ≡φ tr2
if tr1 and tr2 are equal up to recipes and for all recipes
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M1 of tr1 we have that M1φ ↓ =EM2φ ↓, M2 being the
corresponding recipe in tr2. For some 1 < j ≤ kf , we say
that a trace tr1 and a frame φ follow a trace tr2 up to phase
j (resp. follow tr2) if tr1 ≡φ (tr′2ρ) where tr
′
2 is such that
tr2 = tr
′
2.phase(j).tr
′′
2 for some tr
′′
2 (resp. tr
′
2 = tr2) and ρ
is some bijection of handles (so that the notion is insensitive
to choices of handles). The above ensures that tr1 and tr2
compute messages having the same relations w.r.t. outputs
(handles). For instance, if tr = out(c, w).in(c, w) is some
trace, we would like to capture the fact that for a frame φ, any
trace out(c, w).in(c,M) follows tr as long as M computes
the same message as w (i.e. wφ =E Mφ↓). Finally, given an
execution, we say that a voter had an honest interaction up
to phase j (resp. had an honest interaction) when there exist
role session annotations s1, . . . , sn such that the sub-trace
made of all actions labelled by this voter or si with the
resulting frame follow an instance of the honest trace up to
phase j (resp. follow an instance of the honest trace).
Recall that the trace trh from the honest execution is an
instance of the honest trace th and are equal when th has no
unknown part (i.e. second-order variable). The purpose of the
idealised trace in subsequent developments is to consider an
arbitrary, fixed, instantiation that is uniform for all voters and
sessions.
B. Honest Relations Condition
This condition aims at ensuring the absence of id-vote
relations in honest executions. Let nidA (resp. n
id
B ) be the public
identity idA (resp. idB) and as many as necessary (depending
on the protocol) fresh names. We may use A (resp. B) to
refer to idA (resp. idB). Let n
v
0 (resp. n
v
1) be the public vote
v0 (resp. v1) and fresh names. We require these names to be
pairwise distinct. We define the biprocess B at the core of the
Honest Relations Condition:
B = ({Rid(nidA , choice[n
v
0 ,n
v
1 ]),R
v(choice[nidA ,n
id
B ],n
v
0),
Rid(nidB , choice[n
v
1 ,n
v
0 ]),R
v(choice[nidB ,n
id
A ],n
v
1)}⊎
!R; φ0; 1)
The biprocess B represents a system where votes (and vote-
leaking names) are swapped in id-leaking phase and identities
(and id-leaking names) are swapped in vote-leaking phase. The
attacker should not be able to observe any difference in the
absence of relation between identity plus id-leaking names and
vote plus vote-leaking names.
Note that the swaps are inconsistent across phases (i.e. we do
not swap same things in all phases). We could not have defined
such non-uniform swaps by relying on the roles’ processes.
Instead, this has been made possible thanks to our divide &
conquer approach.
Example 14 (Resuming Example 12). One has B =
({1 : out(a, idA ⊕ choice[r0, r1]), 2 : out(a, v0 ⊕ r0), Ab,
1 : out(a, idB ⊕ choice[r1, r0]), 2 : out(a, v1 ⊕
r1), Ab, !Ab}; ∅; 1). We argue that this biprocess is not diff-
equivalent. Indeed, the attacker can xor idA, v0, an output of
phase 1, and an output of phase 2. For one choice of the
outputs, the attacker may obtain 0 on the left. This cannot
happen on the right. The same interaction is also an attack
trace for ballot secrecy.
One requirement of the Honest Relations Condition is the
diff-equivalence of B. However, this alone does not prevent
the honest trace to make explicit links between outputs of
id-leaking phases and inputs of vote-leaking phase (or the
converse). This happens when the honest trace is not phase-
oblivious as defined next.
Definition 11. The honest trace is phase-oblivious when:
• in all input in(c,M) of th in a phase i, handles in M
must not come from phases with a different leaking labels
(i.e., vote or id-leaking) than that of phase i, and
• a variable X ∈ ξ of th must not occur in two phases
having different leaking labels.
Condition 1. (Honest Relations) The Honest Relations
Condition is satisfied if B is diff-equivalent and the honest
trace is phase-oblivious.
C. Tally Condition
The Tally Condition prevents ballot secrecy attacks that
exploit the tally’s outcome. Intuitively, the Condition requires
that for any valid ballot produced by S, either (i) the ballot
stems from an honest execution of A or B, or (ii) it is a
dishonest ballot and in that case, it must be that the vote the
Tally would extract from that ballot is the same before or
after the swap A ↔ B. Formally, we deal with the case (ii)
by considering executions of B so that we can always compare
ballots before or after the swap A ↔ B (i.e. intuitively in S
or in Sr).
Condition 2. (Tally) We assume that B is diff-equivalent. The
Tally Condition holds if for any execution B tr−→B
′ leading to
two frames φl, φr such that the corresponding execution on
the left is fair, it holds that for any ballot ba ∈ BB(tr, φl)
(with w as the handle) then either:
1) there exists a voter V (id, v) which had an honest inter-
action and cast a valid ballot w (it stems from an honest
voter);
2) or there exists some v ∈ V ∪ {⊥} such that
Extract(wφl) ↓ v and Extract(wφr) ↓ v (it may corre-
spond to a dishonest ballot that should not depend on A’s
or B’s vote).
The Tally Condition does not forbid making copies of a
ballot completely “blindly” (i.e., without being able to link
this ballot to a specific voter/identity). Indeed, votes in vote-
leaking phases are identical on both sides of B and the second
case (2) will thus trivially hold. This actually improves the
precision of the condition since such copies are not harmful
w.r.t. ballot secrecy. In fact, the attacker may observe a bias
that he might exploit to learn the vote contained in a specific
ballot, but the attacker would be unable to link this ballot (and
its vote) to a specific voter. Therefore, our condition captures
a refined notion of ballot independence attacks [3].
D. Dishonest Condition
This condition prevents attacks based on actively dishonest
interactions where the attacker deliberately deviates from
the honest trace in order to exploit possibly more links (e.g.
see tainted data example from Introduction). The idea of
the condition is to be able to reduce the behaviours of the
voter system to the parallel composition of all phase roles
that are based on the idealised execution for some names
chosen non-deterministically. The condition requires that if a
voter process moves to the next phase in an execution of the
e-voting system then it must be the case that it had an honest
interaction up to that phase and all agents involved in that
honest interaction are not involved in others. When th = trh
(no unknown part in the honest execution), this is sufficient
to show that roles are indistinguishable from the parallel
composition of phase roles. However, when th 6= trh, some
attacker choices for second second-order variables of th may
break the latter. For that case, the condition thus requires an
additional diff-equivalence between the system based on roles
and the system based on the sequential composition of the
phase roles (i.e. processes A∀). To make sure that the tally’s
outcome could not break this equivalence, we test the former
in presence of an oracle opening all ballots.
Formally, we let V D(nidid ,n
v
i ) be the biprocess obtained by
the (straightforward) merge of the two following processes:
(1) V (nidid ,n
v
i ) and (2) V
∀(nidid ,n
v
i ) (i.e. see Definition 9).
Recall that the process V ∀ forgets the past execution at the
beginning of each phase and behaves as if the past execution
followed the idealised trace. In particular, it forgets previous
(possibly malicious) input messages. We similarly define
biprocesses AD for A ∈ Ro. Given an identity id and a vote
v, we define a process:
Sf(id, v) = νn
id
0 .νn
v
0 .(ΠA∈Ro∪{V }A
D((id,nid0 ), (v,n
v
0)))
where Π denotes a parallel composition and nid0 (resp.
n
v
0) is made of all id-leaking names except the identity
(resp. vote). Intuitively, Sf starts by creating all necessary
names and is then ready to complete one voter session
(according to processes V and A ∈ R on the left and
V ∀, A∀ on the right) using those names. Next, the oracle
opening all valid ballots is as follows: OpenBal = kf :
in(cu, x).let z = Ψ[x] in let v = Extract[x] in out(cu, v))
where cu is some public channel and kf is the last phase
that occurs in the honest trace th. Finally, we define:
BD = ({Sf (A, v0), Sf (B, v1), !OpenBal} ∪ !R;φ0).
Example 15 (Continuing Example 13). The process V D
associated to the FOO protocol is shown below:
1 : M = commit(vi, ki),
e = blind(M,k′i), s = sign(ei, key(id)),
out(c, 〈pk(key(id)); s〉). in(c, x).
if verSign(x, pk(kR)) = e
then 2 : out(a, choice[unblind(x, k′i), sign(M,kR)]).
in(c, y). if y = 〈y1;M〉 then out(c, 〈y1, 〈M,ki〉〉)
Condition 3. (Dishonest) The Dishonest Condition holds
when:
1) For any fair execution (S;φ0; 1)
tr.phase(j)
−−−−−−→(P ;φ; j), if a
process at phase j annotated [id, v] for id ∈ {A,B} and
v ∈ V is present in P then it had an honest interaction
in tr, φ up to phase j. Moreover, authority sessions ai
involved in this honest interaction are not involved in
other honest interactions.
2) If th has some unknown part (i.e. th 6= trh), then the
biprocess BD is diff-equivalent.
E. Main Theorem
Our main theorem states that our three conditions together
imply ballot secrecy. It is based on the following Lemma that
states the essential property we deduce from the Dishonest
Condition. Note that the definition of having honest interac-
tions is straightforwardly extended to executions performed
by phase sub-roles. For instance, V 1(nididA ,n
v
i ) would be
annotated [idA, vi]. We give full proofs of the lemma and our
Main Theorem in Appendix F.
Let vi, vj be some distinct votes in V and tr a trace of
the form tr0.phase(k).tr1 for some 1 ≤ k ≤ kf where no
phase(·) action occurs in tr1. If the dishonest condition holds
then there exists a fair execution
({V (idA, vi), V (idB, vj)}∪ !R;φ0; 1)
tr
−→(P ;φ; k),
if, and only if, there exist pairwise distinct names
n
id
A ,n
id
B ,n
v
i ,n
v
j (not including vote or identity), a trace tr
′ =
tr′0.phase(k).tr
′
1 and a fair execution
({Rid((idA,n
id
A ), (vi,n
v
i )),R
v((idA,n
id
A ), (vi,n
v
i )),
Rid((idB ,n
id
B ), (vj ,n
v
j )),R
v((idB,n
id
B ), (vj ,n
v
j ))}⊎ !R; φ0; 1)
tr′
−→(Q;ψ; k).
where [idA, vi] and [idB , vj ] had an honest interaction in
tr′0.phase(k) up to phase k. ψ. In both directions, we addi-
tionally have that obs(tr′) = obs(tr), φ ∼ ψ and Res(tr, φ) =
Res(tr′, ψ).
If an e-voting protocol ensures the Dishonest Condition, the
Tally Condition, and, the Relation Condition then it ensures
ballot secrecy.
VI. MECHANISATION AND CASE STUDIES
We now apply our technique to several case studies,
illustrating its scope and effectiveness. We show in
Section VI-A how ProVerif can be used to automatically
verify the three conditions. In Section VI-B, we present and
benchmark several e-voting protocols within our class, and
explore several threat models.
A. Verifying the conditions
We explain in this section how to leverage ProVerif to verify
the three conditions via systematic encodings producing
ProVerif models. At the end of this section we present an
algorithm that shows that writing those encodings can be
automated, but leave its implementation as future work. We
show that the time spent by the algorithm computing those
encodings is negligible compared to the time ProVerif spends
to verify the produced models.
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a) Guessing leaking labels: While it would be reasonable
to require from users leaking labels for given e-voting proto-
cols, very simple heuristics to guess them allow to conclude
on all our case studies. First, the registration phase is often
the first phase. Hence, guessing that the first phase is the only
id-leaking phase always allows to conclude on our examples.
Similarly, the following heuristic for guessing leaking labels
of names proved to be precise enough: if the name is output
then it takes the leaking label of the corresponding phase, if
the name is used as signature key then it is id-leaking and
otherwise it takes the leaking label of the phase of its first
use.
b) Sound Verification of The Tally Condition: It is pos-
sible to verify the Tally Condition by analysing the diff-
equivalence of the biprocess B in presence of an oracle
opening all ballots (i.e. OpenBal defined in Section V-D).
The diff-equivalence of BT = B ⊎ {!OpenBal} implies the
diff-equivalence of B and for all executions and valid ballots,
item 2 of the Tally Condition. We formally state and prove
the former in Appendix F. We also describe in Appendix F
an independent way to establish the condition based on trivial
syntactical checks that always imply the Tally Condition but
that is less tight.
c) The Dishonest Condition: We explain how to verify
item (1) of the Dishonest Condition using correspondence
properties of events that ProVerif can verify. We can equip the
e-voting system S with events that are fired with each input
and output, and that contain exchanged messages and session
annotations. Then, the fact that a specific voter passes a phase
or casts a valid ballot can be expressed by such events. Further,
the fact that a specific voter had an honest interaction (up to a
certain phase or not) can be expressed as implications between
events. For instance, if th = out(c, w).in(c, 〈X ;w〉) then one
would write EventIn(a, 〈x; yw〉) ⇒ EventOut((id, v), yw)
where id, v are voter annotations and a is a role session
annotation, x and yw are variables and open messages in events
must pattern-match with the exchanged messages. Note that
this technique has already been used in a different context
in the tool UKano [31]. Next, the fact that such an honest
interaction should be disjoint can be established by verifying
that outputs from honest executions should be different modulo
=E.
d) Algorithm for verifying all conditions: The input format
of our algorithm is a valid ProVerif file containing at least:
public constants modelling φ0 and V , function and reduction
rules modelling Ψb and Extract and a biprocess for each role
describing V,Ro and the idealised execution. Formally, the
left part of a biprocess associated to a role A should model
A(nid,nv) while the right part should model A∀(nid,nv)
where input messages are replaced by messages received in
the honest execution. Moreover, constants in such messages
corresponding to second-order variables in the honest execu-
tion shall be given distinguished names. Therefore, the right
part of those biprocesses both specify the idealised execution
and the honest trace. Hence, the user is just required to specify
an e-voting protocol according to Definition 4.
As explained, from such a file, the honest trace th can be
retrieved (by syntactical equality between inputs and parts of
outputs) and the fact that th is phase-oblivious can be checked
via a linear-time syntactical check. Exploiting the right part of
the given biprocesses, the algorithm can compute A∀(nid,nv)
and thus Ak(nid,nv) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ kf . Using the aforemen-
tioned heuristic, the algorithm guesses leaking labels for names
and phases and deduce Rv(nid,nv) and Rid(nid,nv). The
algorithm then deduces B and, using the two functions mod-
elling Ψb and Extract, it also deduces B
T . When th does con-
tain second-order variables, the algorithm computes BD from
the left part of the given biprocesses and roles A∀(nid,nv).
Finally, the algorithm produces two or three files: (a) a file
containing BT , (b) a file containing correspondence properties
using encoding described above for modelling the Dishonest
Condition, item (1), and, (c) if th 6= trh, a file containing
BD. Then, ProVerif is used to verify the diff-equivalence of
BT , all the correspondence properties and, when necessary,
diff-equivalence of BD. If all checks hold then the algorithm
deduces that the given e-voting protocol ensures ballot secrecy.
All the described tasks the algorithm should perform are
linear-time syntactical manipulations of the given input data.
Therefore, the cost of computing the three ProVerif files is
negligible compared to the time spent by ProVerif for verifying
the files. In our benchmarks, we thus only measured the latter.
B. Case Studies
We now describe the different e-voting systems we verified
with our approach and compare (when possible) with the
current state of the art (see Figure 3). We first give in-depth
descriptions of the JCJ and Lee case studies, and then list other
case studies for which we only give high-level descriptions.
We benchmark the verification times of our approach vs. the
only comparable prior approach, i.e., the swapping tech-
nique [16]. The swapping technique uses a direct encoding
of ballot secrecy in ProVerif with synchronisation barriers
where processes can be swapped. Other approaches are not
automated (require non systematic manual efforts), or do
not deal with the protocols and threat models we consider
(see discussions in Section VII). Notably, while Tamarin is
expressive enough to describe our case studies [18], it does
not yet allow to automatically prove them. We summarise our
results in Figure 3 and provide all our ProVerif models at [32].
a) JCJ Protocol [22]: We analysed the JCJ protocol [22]
used in the Civitas system [33]. It has been designed to achieve
a strong notion of privacy (i.e. coercion-resistance) but we
limit our analysis to ballot secrecy.
The JCJ protocol is depicted in Figure 4. In a first phase,
the voter requests a credential by disclosing its identity to
a registrar who replies on a secure channel with a fresh
credential cred . In a second phase, the registrar sends to the
tally the created credential randomised and encrypted with the
tally’s public key and signed with the registrar’s signing key.
This will be used by the tally to authenticate ballots from
registered voters. Then, in a third phase, the voter casts his
ballot who takes the form of a complex Zero Knowledge (ZK)
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Analysis time in seconds
Protocol Ballot Secrecy Swapping Our approach
FOO verified 0.26 0.04
Lee 1 verified 46.00 0.04
Lee 2 verified ✝ 0.05
Lee 3 verified ✝ 0.01
Lee 4 attack 169.94 6.64
JCJ verified ⋆ 18.79
Belenios verified ⋆ 0.02
Fig. 3. Analysed protocols and results. Tests were performed using ProVerif 1.94 on a single 2.67GHz Xeon core with 48GB of RAM. ✝ indicates non-
termination within 45 hours or consumption of more than 30GB of RAM. We use ⋆ to indicate the approach yielded spurious attacks, which implies that the
analysis is inconclusive. All our ProVerif models are available from [32].
proof whose the public part (first argument of ZK) includes
(i) a randomised encryption of her vote and (ii) a randomised
encryption of her credential and whose the private part (second
argument) contains the knowledge of the underlying credential
and vote. The tally can then verify the ZK proof and perform
a Plaintext Equality Test (PET) between part (ii) of the ZK
proof and some encrypted credential that has been signed by
and received from the registrar (at this point, the ballot is
verified and can be published on the bulletin board). Finally,
the encrypted vote can be opened, possibly after mixing, to
reveal the vote.
We adapted the modelling from [15] (including the modelling
of the ZK proofs) to consider a strictly stronger threat model
(for ballot secrecy). We assumed that the registrar and the
tally are honest, but that their secret keys skR and skT are
compromised. We let the tally output verified ballots on the
public channel cb (thereby also taking the role of the ballot
box). A voter requests a credential by revealing its identity
in the clear but receives its credential on a secure channel.
Voters send ballots on an anonymous channel. Naturally, the
first phase and cred are id-leaking, while the two last phases
and r1V , r
2
V , rR can be considered vote-leaking (following the
heuristic from Section VI-A). We were able to establish our
three conditions automatically with ProVerif and therefore
establish ballot secrecy.
In comparison, the direct encoding of ballot secrecy with the
swapping technique [16] fails to establish ballot secrecy. We
have identified two main, independent reasons. First, when
considering an unbounded number of honest voters, one also
needs to consider an unbounded number of sessions of the
registrar (this holds for the tallier as well). This is incompatible
with equipping the registrar with synchronisation barriers
yielding spurious attacks in practice (registrar sessions for
A and B should be swapped after the first phase). While it
may be possible to manually apply the barriers elimination
theorem [16], an independent problem inherent to the swap-
ping technique still prevents us to conclude. Indeed, even
when considering the simplest scenario with only two honest
voters and no dishonest voter, the swapping technique on our
model yields a spurious attack. This is caused by a systematic
limitation of the latter technique when ballot secrecy relies on
the freshness of data produced in previous phases (here cred ).
We explain the underlying reason in Section VII-0a. Those
two limitations are still problematic when the two last phases
are collapsed and removing all phases is not successful either.
We note that unlike the automatic analysis of JCJ from [17],
we took the registration phase into account. Importantly, [17]
would not be able to do the same since their framework
allows only one phase before the tally (i.e., the voting phase).
Therefore, this is a real limitation and not a simple divergence
of modelling choices. Note also that [15] analyses JCJ for
coercion-resistance. However, they considered a simpler threat
model in which the registration phase is completely hidden
from the attacker. Moreover, their approach required manually
and cleverly designed protocol-specific encodings since one
has to “explicitly encode in the biprocess the proof strategy”
according to [15].
b) Lee et al. Protocol [24]: We now support the claim that
our class of e-voting protocols is expressive enough to capture
a large class of threat models by analysis several threat models
for Lee et al. (variant proposed in [24]). This protocol contains
two phases. In the registration phase, each voter encrypts
her vote with the tally’s public key, signs the ciphertext and
(output i) sends both messages to the registrar. The registrar
verifies the signature, re-encrypts the ciphertext using a fresh
nonce and (output ii) sends to the voter this signed ciphertext
along with a Designated Verifier Proof (DVP) of re-encryption.
The voter can then verify the signature and the DVP. Finally, in
the voting phase, the voter (output iii) sends its ballot, which
is the previously received signed re-encryption. We reused and
adapted ProVerif models from [16].
Lee 1. The first threat model we consider is the only one
analysed in [16]. It considers the registrar’s signature key
and the tally’s private key corrupted, and considers infinitely
dishonest voters. The channel of outputs (i) and (ii) is assumed
to be untappable (i.e. everything is completely invisible to the
attacker) while the channel of output (iii) is anonymous. Since
the registrar’s signing key is corrupted, the dishonest voters
do not need to have access to registrar sessions (they can
be played by the environment). Similarly, there is no need
to explicitly model the tally. This considerably simplifies the
models one needs to consider, partly explaining the effective-
ness of the swapping technique [16] (46s).
Lee 2. In this scenario, we no longer consider the tally’s
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id, v
Voter
skR
Registrar
skT
Tallier
id
cred
sign(aenc(〈cred , rR〉, pkT ), skR)
ZK([aenc(〈cred , r1V 〉, pkT ), aenc(〈v, r
2
V 〉, pkT )]; [cred , v, r
1
V , r
2
V ])
Fig. 4. Informal presentation of JCJ (phases are separated by dashed lines)
key corrupted. When verifying ballot secrecy without our
conditions, it is thus mandatory to explicitly model the
tally. This change to the model causes ProVerif to not
terminate on the direct encoding of ballot secrecy with
the swapping technique. We thus tried to approximate the
model. We collapsed the two phases into one, which enables
ProVerif to terminate in 45.33 seconds on the direct-encoding.
Unfortunately, this approximation does not always solve the
problem: if the security relies on the phases, one would obtain
spurious attacks. For instance, removing all phases causes
ProVerif to return a spurious attack. More importantly, this
approximation is not sound in general (we may miss some
attacks). In contrast, the verification of our conditions only
takes a fraction of a second without the above approximation.
Lee 3. We additionally consider a secure registrar signing key.
We now need to explicitly model a registrar for dishonest
voters. As for the previous model, ProVerif is unable to directly
conclude. After collapsing phases, it terminates in 269.06 sec-
onds. In contrast, our approach concludes in under 0.1 second.
Lee 4. We modify the previous threat model and weaken the
output channel’s security (i) to be insecure instead of untap-
pable. In this case, ballot secrecy no longer holds. ProVerif
returns an attack on the tally condition (verified using the
ballot-opening oracle; see Section VI-A). Relying on the latter,
we can immediately infer the attack on ballot secrecy.
c) Other Case Studies: We verified the three conditions
for FOO [29] as described in our running example (with a
dishonest registrar and considering dishonest voters). We use
the same modelling and threat model as in [16].
We analysed the Belenios protocol [23] (in its mixnet ver-
sion), which builds on the Helios protocol [34], and considered
the same threat model as for JCJ. Again, contrary to [17],
we took the registration phase into account. Note that the
swapping technique failed to conclude because of spurious
attacks for similar reasons as for JCJ.
We finally discuss the protocol due to Okamoto [35] as
modelled in [24]. This protocol features trap-door commit-
ments that ProVerif is currently unable to deal with. However,
this protocol lies in our class and our theorem thus applies.
This could both ease manual verification and future automated
verification (e.g. recent analysis [18]).
VII. RELATED WORK
As mentioned before, diff-equivalence is known to be too
imprecise to analyse vote-privacy via a direct encoding (ac-
knowledged e.g. in [15], [16], [24], [26]).
a) Swapping technique: The swapping technique origi-
nates from [26], and 8 years later, was formally proven and
implemented in ProVerif [16]. It aims to improve the precision
of diff-equivalence for protocols with synchronisation barriers.
The main idea is to guess some process permutations at the
beginning of each barrier and then verify a modified protocol
based on these permutations. We give an example showing this
mechanism in Appendix G. Theoretically, the permutations do
not break trace equivalence since they transform configurations
into structurally equivalent configurations. This approach is
only compatible with replication in a very constrained way: all
barriers above and below a replication must be removed, which
reduces precision. Given a model with barriers, the front-
end first generates several biprocesses without barriers, each
corresponding to a possible swap strategy (i.e. the permutation
done at each barrier); note that the number of such strategies
grows exponentially with the size of the system (number of
phases or number of roles). The equivalence holds if one of
the produced biprocesses is diff-equivalent (proven in [16]).
Similar techniques [18] have been used in the tool Tamarin
relying on multisets. Essentially, all agents are put in a multiset
at synchronisation barriers and a rule allows to shuffle this
multiset before moving to the next phase. Therefore, the
same limitations w.r.t. replications hold. Moreover, Tamarin
will also have to explore all possible swaps. The fact that
no replication can be put under a barrier notably forbids
to model authorities crossing phases (because one needs to
consider unbounded number of sessions of them) as well
as threat models where no dishonest voter is considered for
the same reason. The swapping approach also suffers from
systematic precision issues when the security relies on the
freshness of data created in previous phases. Indeed, the
compiler introduces many new internal communications in the
produced biprocesses. However, the very abstract treatment
of internal communication used by ProVerif causes the tool
to also explore the possibility of swapping data with an old
session whose data has already been swapped before. We
consider this to be a significant limitation, which manifests
itself as spurious attacks e.g. the ones for JCJ and Belenios
(see Figure 3); the credential being the fresh data coming from
the registration phase and used during the voting phase. We
provide more details in Appendix H.
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b) Small-attack property: A different line of work is to
devise small attack properties, as for example in [17] for
ballot secrecy. They show that proving ballot secrecy for some
specific finite-scenarios implies ballot secrecy for the general,
unbounded case. The focus in [17] is on complex ballot weed-
ing mechanisms, as used for example in Helios [34]. In con-
trast to our work, they require that the pre-tally part contains
only one voting phase that must be action-determinate (same
actions yield statically equivalent frames). This approach is
therefore unable to deal with e-voting protocol models that
involve more than one phase, like the ones we consider in
Section VI. Moreover, considering only one phase greatly
simplifies the verification since it hides the diff-equivalence
problems mentioned previously. Moreover, the finite-scenarios
still lead to state space explosion problems. Because of this,
they were unable to automatically verify the JCJ protocol, even
without modelling the registration phase.
c) Privacy via type-checking: A sound type system
for proving trace equivalence has been proposed [19],
which seems a promising approach. This work reuses diff-
equivalence as an approximation of trace equivalence and thus
suffers from its limitations. Moreover, it is limited to standard
primitives ((a)symmetric encryption, signatures, pairing, and
hashing), which means that it currently cannot deal with
our case studies, since the protocols in our case studies use
primitives that are not supported by this method yet.
The analysis method we develop in this paper borrows the
methodological approach of [31]: devise sufficient conditions
implying a complex privacy property hard to verify, via a
careful analysis and categorisation of known attacks. However,
we target a different class of protocols and property and devise
different conditions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented three conditions that together imply ballot
secrecy. They proved to be tight enough to be conclusive on
several case studies. Verifying ballot secrecy in a modular
way via our conditions constitutes a new approach which
outperforms prior works: we cover a greater class of e-voting
protocols and threat models, and the analysis is more efficient.
Our new approach has also opened several avenues for future
work. First, our notion of tally is currently limited. Hence,
our method is currently unable to deal with revotes. While
adding revotes might be directly achievable, we conjecture that
considering revoting policies (e.g. ballot weeding in Helios as
analysed in [17]) is a more intricate challenge. Furthermore,
our notion of tally cannot deal with homomorphic tallying
and only produces a set of votes, while e-voting protocols
satisfying verifiability should also produce verification data
(e.g. ZK proofs of correct decryption). We would like to
extend our class of e-voting protocols accordingly. Second,
our notion of fairness and our Dishonest Condition currently
lack precision in the presence of certain mixnet roles. For
instance, a degenerated mixnet such as M = 1 : in(c, x).2 :
out(c, dec(x, k)) (where c is public) currently introduces spu-
rious attacks that are not prevented by our fairness condition
and that are detected by our Dishonest Condition (note that
the problem disappears when c is private). Third, we believe
that our conditions can be adapted to enforce more complex
privacy-type properties in e-voting protocols such as receipt-
freeness and coercion-resistance [15], [24]. Fourth, we want
to implement our algorithm for verifying all conditions as a
ProVerif front-end.
We think that the modular privacy via sufficient conditions
methodology we presented advances the state-of-the-art for the
automated analysis of privacy-related properties, and paves the
way for further developments.
REFERENCES
[1] Bernhard, D., Cortier, V., Galindo, D., Pereira, O., Warinschi, B.: SoK:
A comprehensive analysis of game-based ballot privacy definitions. In:
Proc. 35th Symposium on Security and Privacy, (S&P’15), IEEE (2015)
[2] Cortier, V., Galindo, D., Ku¨sters, R., Mu¨ller, J., Truderung, T.: Sok:
Verifiability notions for e-voting protocols. In: Proc. 36th Symposium
on Security and Privacy, (S&P’16), IEEE (2016)
[3] Cortier, V., Smyth, B.: Attacking and fixing helios: An analysis of ballot
secrecy. Journal of Computer Security 21(1) (2013) 89–148
[4] Cortier, V., Lallemand, J.: Voting: You can’t have privacy without
individual verifiability. In: Proc. of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, ACM (2018) 53–66
[5] Kremer, S., Rønne, P.: To du or not to du: A security analysis of
du-vote. In: Proc. 1st European Symposium on Security and Privacy
(EuroS&P’16), IEEE (March 2016) 303–323
[6] Cortier, V., Dra˘gan, C.C., Dupressoir, F., Schmidt, B., Strub, P.Y.,
Warinschi, B.: Machine-checked proofs of privacy for electronic voting
protocols. In: Proc. Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE (2017)
993–1008
[7] Meier, S., Schmidt, B., Cremers, C., Basin, D.: The Tamarin Prover for
the Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols. In: Proc. 25th International
Conference on Computer Aided Verification (CAV’13), Springer (2013)
696–701
[8] Armando, A., et al.: The AVANTSSAR platform for the automated
validation of trust and security of service-oriented architectures. In:
Proc. 18th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the
Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS’12), Springer 267–282
[9] Blanchet, B.: An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on
Prolog Rules. In: Proc. 14th Computer Security Foundations Workshop
(CSFW’01), IEEE Comp. Soc. Press (2001) 82–96
[10] Cremers, C.: The Scyther Tool: Verification, falsification, and analysis of
security protocols. In: Proceedings of CAV’08. LNCS, Springer (2008)
[11] Basin, D., Cremers, C.: Know your enemy: Compromising adversaries
in protocol analysis. ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security (TISSEC) 17(2) (2014) 7
[12] Basin, D., Dreier, J., Hirschi, L., Radomirovic, S., Sasse, R., Stettler,
V.: A formal analysis of 5g authentication. In: Proc. of the 2018 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM
(2018) 1383–1396
[13] Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., Kobeissi, N.: Verified models and reference
implementations for the tls 1.3 standard candidate. In: Security and
Privacy (SP), 2017 IEEE Symposium on, IEEE (2017) 483–502
[14] Delaune, S., Hirschi, L.: A survey of symbolic methods for establishing
equivalence-based properties in cryptographic protocols. Journal of
Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming (2016)
[15] Backes, M., Hritcu, C., Maffei, M.: Automated verification of remote
electronic voting protocols in the applied pi-calculus. In: Proc. 21st IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Symposium, (CSF’08), IEEE Computer
Society Press (2008) 195–209
[16] Blanchet, B., Smyth, B.: Automated reasoning for equivalences in the
applied pi calculus with barriers. In: Proc. 29th Computer Security
Foundations Symposium, (CSF’16), IEEE (2016)
[17] Myrto Arapinis, V.C., Kremer, S.: Three voters are enough for privacy
properties. In: Proc. European Symposium on Research in Computer
Security, (ESORICS’16), Springer (2016)
15
[18] Dreier, J., Dume´nil, C., Kremer, S., Sasse, R.: Beyond subterm-
convergent equational theories in automated verification of stateful
protocols. In: Proc. 6th International Conference on Principles of
Security and Trust, (POST’17). (2017)
[19] Cortier, V., Grimm, N., Lallemand, J., Maffei, M.: A type system
for privacy properties. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM (2017)
409–423
[20] Cortier, V.: Electronic voting: how logic can help. In: Proc. International
Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning, (IJCAR’14), Springer (2014)
16–25
[21] Basin, D., Radomirovic, S., Schmid, L.: Alethea: A provably secure
random sample voting protocol. In: 2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security
Foundations Symposium (CSF), IEEE (2018) 283–297
[22] Juels, A., Catalano, D., Jakobsson, M.: Coercion-resistant electronic
elections. In: Proc. ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society,
ACM (2005) 61–70
[23] Cortier, V., Galindo, D., Glondu, S., Izabachene, M.: Election verifi-
ability for helios under weaker trust assumptions. In: Proc. European
Symposium on Research in Computer Security, (ESORICS’14), Springer
(2014) 327–344
[24] Delaune, S., Kremer, S., Ryan, M.D.: Verifying privacy-type properties
of electronic voting protocols. Journal of Computer Security (2009)
435–487
[25] Kremer, S., Ryan, M.D.: Analysis of an electronic voting protocol
in the applied pi-calculus. In: Proc. 14th European Symposium on
Programming (ESOP’05), Springer (2005) 186–200
[26] Delaune, S., Ryan, M.D., Smyth, B.: Automatic verification of privacy
properties in the applied pi-calculus. In: Proceedings 2nd Joint iTrust
and PST Conferences on Privacy, Trust Management and Security,
(IFIPTM’08), Springer (2008)
[27] Blanchet, B., Abadi, M., Fournet, C.: Automated verification of selected
equivalences for security protocols. Journal of Logic and Algebraic
Programming (2008)
[28] Abadi, M., Fournet, C.: Mobile values, new names, and secure com-
munication. In: Proc. 28th Symposium on Principles of Programming
Languages, (POPL’01), ACM Press (2001)
[29] Fujioka, A., Okamoto, T., Ohta, K.: A practical secret voting scheme
for large scale elections. In: Proc. International Workshop on the Theory
and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Springer (1992) 244–251
[30] Blanchet, B., Smyth, B., Cheval, V., Sylvestre, M.: ProVerif 1.96:
automatic cryptographic protocol verifier, users manual and tuto-
rial. http://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/bblanche/proverif/manual.
pdf (Accessed: 2018-11-12) (2016)
[31] Hirschi, L., Baelde, D., Delaune, S.: A method for verifying privacy-
type properties: the unbounded case. In: Proc. 37th IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, (S&P’16), IEEE (2016)
[32] Cremers, C., Hirschi, L.: Proverif models for our case studies. https://
drive.google.com/open?id=13NYnNTlVff5zQnssWSNzubR8o1dAcHHi
(2018) Accessed: 2018-11-12.
[33] Clarkson, M.R., Chong, S., Myers, A.C.: Civitas: Toward a secure voting
system. In: Proc. Symposium on Security and Privacy, (S&P’08), IEEE
(2008) 354–368
[34] Adida, B.: Helios: Web-based open-audit voting. In: USENIX Security
Symposium. Volume 17. (2008) 335–348
[35] Okamoto, T.: An electronic voting scheme. In: Advanced IT Tools.
Springer (1996) 21–30
APPENDIX
[Supplementary material]
A. Term algebra
We now present the term algebra used to model messages
built and manipulated using various cryptographic primitives.
We assume an infinite set N of names, used to represent keys
and nonces; and two infinite and disjoint sets of variables X
and W . Variables in X are used to refer to unknown parts
of messages expected by participants, while variables in W
(called handles) are used to store messages learned by the
attacker. We consider a signature Σ (i.e. a set of function
symbols with their arity). Σ is the union of two disjoint sets:
the constructor and destructor symbols, i.e., Σ = Σc ∪ Σd.
Given a signature F , and a set of initial data A, we denote by
T (F ,A) the set of terms built using atoms in A and function
symbols in F . A constructor term is a term in T (Σc,N ∪X ).
We denote by vars(u) the set of variables that occur in a term
u and call messages the constructor terms that are ground
(i.e., vars(u) = ∅). Sequences of elements are shown bold
(e.g. x,n). The application of a substitution σ to a term u is
written uσ, and dom(σ) denotes its domain.
Example 16. Consider the signature
Σ = { sign, verSign, pkv, blind, unblind, commit,
open, 〈 〉, π1, π2, eq, ok}.
The symbols sign, verSign, blind, unblind, commit and open
of arity 2 represent signature, signature verification, blind
signature, unblind, commitment and commitment opening.
Pairing is modelled using 〈〉 of arity 2, whereas projection
functions are denoted π1 and π2, both of arity 1. Finally, we
consider the symbol eq of arity 2 to model equality tests, as
well as the constant symbol ok. This signature is split into two
parts: Σc = {sign, pkv, blind, unblind, commit, 〈 〉, ok} and
Σd = {verSign, open, π1, π2, eq}.
1) Equational Theories: As in the process calculus presented
in [27], constructor terms are subject to an equational the-
ory used for for modelling algebraic properties of crypto-
graphic primitives. Formally, we consider a congruence =E
on T (Σc,N ∪ X ), generated from a set of equations E over
T (Σc,X ). We say that a function symbol is free when it does
not occur in E.
Example 17. To reflect the algebraic properties of the blind
signature, we may consider the equational theory generated by
the following equations:
unblind(sign(blind(xm, y), zk), y) = sign(xm, zk)
unblind(blind(xm, y), y) = xm.
2) Computation relation and rewriting systems: We can also
give a meaning to destructor symbols. For this, we need a
notion of computation relation ↓: T (Σ,N ) × T (Σc,N ) such
that for any term t, (t ↓ u ⇐⇒ t ↓ u′) if, and only if, u =E
u′. While the precise definition of the computation relation is
unimportant for this paper, we describe how it can be obtained
from rewriting systems.
A rewriting system is a set of rewriting rules
g(u1, . . . , un)→ u where g is a destructor, and
u, u1, . . . , un ∈ T (Σc,X ). A ground term t can be
rewritten into t′ if there is a position p in t and a rewriting
rule g(u1, . . . , un) → u such that t|p = g(v1, . . . , vn) and
v1 =E u1θ, . . . , vn =E unθ for some substitution θ, and
t′ = t[uθ]p (i.e. t in which the sub-term at position p has
been replaced by uθ).
Moreover, we assume that u1θ, . . . , unθ, and uθ are mes-
sages. Finally, for some term t, we have t ↓ u when u is a
message such that t → u. We write t ↓ to denote that there
exists some u such that t↓u, and write t 8 otherwise.
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P,Q := 0 null
| in(c, x).P input
| out(c, u).P output
| let x = v in P else Q evaluation
| P | Q parallel
| νn.P restriction
| !P replication
| i : P phase
where c ∈ C, x ∈ X , n ∈ N , u ∈ T (Σc,N ∪ X ), i ∈ N, and
v ∈ T (Σ,N ∪ X ).
Fig. 5. Syntax of processes
Example 18. The properties of symbols in Σd (see Exam-
ple 16) are reflected through the following rewriting rules:
open(commit(xm, y), y)→ xm eq(x, x)→ ok
verSign(sign(xm, zk), pkv(zk))→ xm
πi(〈x1, x2〉)→ xi for i ∈ {1, 2}.
This rewriting system is convergent modulo the equational
theory E given in Example 17, and induces a computation
relation as described above. For instance, we have that
open(verSign(t, pkv(skA)), kc)↓v
where t = unblind(sign(blind(commit(v, kc), kb), skA), kb))
because t =E sign(commit(v, kc), skA).
Example 19. We are able to model the ∧ boolean operators
using a destructor and ∈ Σc∩Σpub and the following rewriting
rule: and(x, y) → ok. The induced computational relation
satisfies for any terms t1, t2 that and(t1, t2) ↓ ok if, and only
if, t1 ↓ and t2 ↓.
For modelling purposes, we also split the signature Σ into
two parts, namely Σpub (public function symbols, known by
the attacker) and Σpriv (private function symbols). An attacker
builds his own messages by applying public function symbols
to terms he already knows and that are available through
variables in W . Formally, a computation done by the attacker
is a recipe (noted R), i.e., a term in T (Σpub,W).
B. Process algebra
We assume Cpub and Cpriv are disjoint sets of public and
private channel names and note C = Cpub ∪ Cpriv. Protocols
are specified using the syntax in Figure 1.
Most of the constructions are standard. The construct let x =
v in P else Q tries to evaluate the term v and in case of
success, i.e. when v↓u for some message u, the process P in
which x is substituted by u is executed; otherwise the process
Q is executed. Note also that the let instruction together
with the eq theory (see Example 18) can encode the usual
conditional construction. The replication !P behaves like an
infinite parallel composition P |P |P | . . .. We shall always deal
with guarded processes of the form i : P . Such a construct
i : P indicates that the process P may be executed only when
the current phase is i. The construct νn.P allows to create
a new, fresh name n. For a sequence of names n, we may
note νn.P to denote the sequence of creation of names in n
V (id, v) = 1 : νk.νk′.out(c, 〈pk(key(id)); s〉).in(c, x).
if verSign(x, pk(kR)) = e
then 2 : out(c, unblind(x, k′)).in(c, y).
if y = 〈y1;M〉
then out(c, 〈y1, 〈M,k〉〉)
Fig. 6. Voter role of FOO (for some channel c ∈ Cpub, where M =
commit(v, k), e = blind(M, k′) and s = sign(e, key(id)))
followed by P . For brevity, we sometimes omit “else 0” and
null processes at the end of processes. We write fv(P ) for the
set of free variables of P , i.e. the set of variables that are not
in the scope of an input or a let construct. A process P is
ground if fv(P ) = ∅.
The operational semantics of processes is given by a labelled
transition system over configurations (denoted by K) (P ;φ; i)
made of a multiset P of ground processes, i ∈ N the current
phase, and a frame φ = {w1 7→ u1, . . . , wn 7→ un} (i.e.
a substitution where ∀i, wi ∈ W , ui ∈ T (Σc,N )). The
frame φ represents the messages known to the attacker. Given
a configuration K , φ(K) denotes its frame. We often write
P ∪P instead of {P}∪P and implicitly remove null processes
from configurations.
Example 20. We use the FOO protocol [29] (modelled as
in [16]) as a running example. FOO involves voters and a
registrar role. In the first phase, a voter commits and then
blinds its vote and sends this blinded commit signed with
his own signing key key(id) to the registrar. The function
symbol key(·) is a free private function symbol associating
a secret key to each identity. The registrar is then supposed
to blindly sign the committed vote with his own signing key
kR ∈ Σc∩Σpriv and sends this to the voter. In the voting phase,
voters anonymously output their committed vote signed by the
registrar and, on request, anonymously send the opening for
their committed vote.
The process corresponding to a voter session (depending
on some constant id and a constant v) is depicted in Fig-
ure 6. A configuration corresponding to a voter A ready to
vote v1 with an environment knowing the registrar’s key is
K1 = ({V (A, v1)}; {wR 7→ kR}; 1).
The operational semantics of a process is given by the relation
α
−→ defined as the least relation over configurations satisfying
the rules in Figure 2. For all constructs, phases are just handed
over to continuation processes. Except for the phases, the rules
are quite standard and correspond to the intuitive meaning of
the syntax given in the previous section.
The rules IN,OUT,NEXT are the only rules that produce
observable actions (i.e., non τ -actions). The relation α1...αn−−−−−→
between configurations (where α1 . . . αn is a sequence of
actions) is defined as the transitive closure of α−→.
C. Trace Equivalence
Continuing Paragraph III-0d, we give the formal definition
of static equivalence.
17
Definition 12. A frame φ is statically included in φ′ when
dom(φ) = dom(φ′), and
• for any recipe R such that Rφ ↓ u for some u, we have
that Rφ′ ↓u′ for some u′;
• for any recipes R1, R2 such that R1φ ↓ u and R2φ ↓ u
for some message u, there exists a message v such that
R1φ
′ ↓v and R2φ′ ↓v.
Two frames φ and φ′ are in static equivalence, written φ ∼ φ′,
if the two static inclusions hold.
Example 21. Continuing Example 3, we give the formal
witness of statically inequivalence. Recall that φ is as in
Example 2 and φ′ = φ{v1 7→ v2} i.e. the frame one obtains
from φ by replacing the constant v1 by the constant v2. If we
let Ro be the recipe open(π2(π1(w3)), π2(π2(w3))) and R1 be
the recipe v1, one would obtain Roφ ↓ v1 and R1 ↓ v1 =E v1
while Roφ
′ ↓v2 but R1 ↓v1 6=E v2.
Recall that obs(tr) is defined as the subsequence of tr
obtained by erasing all the τ actions (i.e. τ, τthen, τelse).
Definition 13. Let K1 and K2 be two configurations. We say
that K1 is trace included in K2, written K1 ⊑ K2, when,
for any K1
tr
−→K
′
1 there exists K2
tr′
−→K
′
2 such that obs(tr) =
obs(tr′) and φ(K ′1) ∼ φ(K
′
2). They are in trace equivalence,
written K1 ≈ K2, when K1 ⊑ K2 and K2 ⊑ K1.
D. Diff-Equivalence
The semantics of bi-processes is defined as expected via a
relation that expresses when and how a bi-configuration may
evolve. A bi-process reduces if, and only if, both sides of the
bi-process reduce in the same way triggering the same rule:
e.g., a conditional has to be evaluated in the same way on
both sides. For instance, the THEN and ELSE rules for the
LET construct are depicted in Figure 7.
When the two sides of the bi-process reduce in different
ways, the bi-process blocks. The relation tr−→bi on bi-processes
is therefore defined as for processes. This leads us to the
following notion of diff-equivalence.
Definition 14. A bi-configurationK0 satisfies diff-equivalence
if for every bi-configuration K = (P ;φ) such that K0
tr
−→biK
for some trace tr, we have that:
• both sides generate statically equivalent frames: fst(φ) ∼
snd(φ);
• both sides are able to execute same actions: if
fst(K) α−→AL then there exists a bi-configurationK
′ such
that K α−→biK
′ and fst(K ′) = AL (and similarly for snd).
E. Conditions
Example 22. Consider a voter’s role process V (id, v) = 1 :
out(a, id).out(a, v) (other components are unimportant here).
This trivial protocol is an abstraction of a registration phase
(voter sends its identity) followed by a voting phase (voter
sends its vote). We show this does not ensure ballot secrecy.
Consider the following fair execution: (S; ∅; 1) tr−→(∅;φ; 1) with
tr = out(a, wid).out(a, wv).out(a, w
′
id).out(a, w
′
v) and φ =
{wid 7→ A,wv 7→ v0, w′id 7→ B,w
′
v 7→ v1}. This execution
has no indistinguishable counterpart in Sr. Indeed, because the
first message reveals the identity of the voter, the attacker can
make sure that the voter A executes the first output (i.e. wid)
on the Sr side as well. After the first output wid 7→ A, the Sr
side can only output either B or v1 (because A votes v1 in Sr)
but not v0. However, because the second message reveals the
vote, the attacker expects a message v0 and can test whether
wv equals v0 or not. To summarise, the only executions of
(Sr ; ∅; 1) following the same trace tr produce frames that are
never statically equivalent to φ. Thus, this protocol does not
ensure ballot secrecy because in a single phase (i.e., phase 1),
there is one output revealing the identity of the voter and one
output revealing the voter’s vote.
However, the process V (id, v) = 1 : out(a, id). 2 : out(a, v)
ensures ballot secrecy and does not suffer from the above
problem. The attacker cannot force A to execute its first
message leaking identity and then immediately its second
message leaking its vote, because doing so would kill the
process V (B, v1) (which is still in phase 1) preventing the
whole execution from being fair. Thus, the attacker has to
trigger all possible first-phase actions of A and B before
moving to the second phase. After the first phase, we end
up with the processes {out(a, v0), out(a, v1)} on the S side
and {out(a, v1), out(a, v0)} on the Sr side, which are indis-
tinguishable.
Thus, in this first iteration, we split outputs revealing identity
and outputs revealing votes in distinct phases. This enables
breaking links between identity and vote.
F. Proofs of the Main Theorem
Let vi, vj be some distinct votes in V and tr a trace of
the form tr0.phase(k).tr1 for some 1 ≤ k ≤ kf where no
phase(·) action occurs in tr1. If the dishonest condition holds
then there exists a fair execution
({V (idA, vi), V (idB, vj)}∪ !R;φ0; 1)
tr
−→(P ;φ; k),
if, and only if, there exist pairwise distinct names
n
id
A ,n
id
B ,n
v
i ,n
v
j (not including vote or identity), a trace tr
′ =
tr′0.phase(k).tr
′
1 and a fair execution
({Rid((idA,n
id
A ), (vi,n
v
i )),R
v((idA,n
id
A ), (vi,n
v
i )),
Rid((idB ,n
id
B ), (vj ,n
v
j )),R
v((idB,n
id
B ), (vj ,n
v
j ))}⊎ !R; φ0; 1)
tr′
−→(Q;ψ; k).
where [idA, vi] and [idB , vj ] had an honest interaction in
tr′0.phase(k) up to phase k. ψ. In both directions, we addi-
tionally have that obs(tr′) = obs(tr), φ ∼ ψ and Res(tr, φ) =
Res(tr′, ψ).
Proof. (⇒) By fairness, we deduce that, in the given execu-
tion after the action phase(k), there are processes annotated
[idA, vi] and [idB , vj ] both at phase k. First item of the
Dishonest Condition implies that A and B had (disjoint)
honest interactions in tr0.phase(k) up to phase k. This allows
us to define properly names nidA ,n
id
B ,n
v
i ,n
v
j and all (disjoint)
authorities sessions involved in those two disjoint honest
interactions (note that names used in authorities starting in
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LET (i : let x = choice[vl, vr] in P else Q ∪ P ;φ; i)
τthen−−→ (i : P{x 7→ choice[ul, ur]} ∪ P ;φ; i)
when vl ↓ul and vr ↓ur for some ul, ur
LET-FAIL (i : let x = choice[vl, vr] in P else Q ∪ P ;φ; i)
τelse−−→ (i : Q ∪ P ;φ; i) when vl 8 and vr 8
Fig. 7. Two rules of the semantics for bi-processes
phases k′ > k can be chosen arbitrarily). As a slight abuse of
notation, we may omit the vote or the identity from those
vectors and write for instance nidA to refer to (idA,n
id
A ).
Moving backward some τ actions, one obtains a fair execution
(({V (nidA ,n
v
i ), V (n
id
B ,n
v
j )}⊎ !R⊎
A∈Ro
{A(nidA ,n
v
i ), A(n
id
B ,n
v
j )};φ0; 1)
tr′
0
.phase(k).tr′
1−−−−−−−−−→(P
′;φ; k)
(1)
with obs(tr) = obs(tr′) where tr′ = tr′0.phase(k).tr
′
1. We now
distinguish two cases whether th = trh or not to prove that
the latter execution can also be executed starting with roles
A∀ instead of A.
If th = trh then there is only one instantiation of the honest
trace. Therefore, voters A and B followed the idealised trace
in tr0.phase(k) up to phase k. Therefore, their executions up
to the action phase(k) can be exactly mimicked by executions
of processes A∀ for A ∈ Ro ∪ {V } with appropriate names.
Indeed, once names nidid ,n
v
i are fixed, there is only one
possible execution (modulo =E) following the trace tr
h and
this is, by definition of those processes, an execution A∀ can
play. Moreover, the resulting processes for A and B right after
the action phase(k) are the same when starting with A(·, ·)
for A ∈ Ro ∪ {V } or with A∀(·, ·); they are indeed of the
form V kf (·, ·). Hence, the final sub-trace tr
′
1 can equally be
executed by roles A∀. Note also that the resulting frame is
ψ = φ and the resulting trace has same observable actions as
tr′.
Otherwise (i.e. trh 6= th). We remark that the multiset of
processes at the beginning of Execution 1 can be reached
from the multiset of processes {Sf(A, vi), Sf (B, vj)}⊎ !R.
The Execution 1 can thus be played by the right side of
the biprocess BD (or by a biprocess one can obtain from it
by applying a bijection of free public constants). Applying
diff-equivalence of BD (i.e. second item of the Dishonest
Condition) and the fact that diff-equivalence is stable by
bijection of free, public constants, allows us to replace V (resp.
role process A) by V ∀ (resp. A∀) in the latter execution whilst
preserving the executability of the same observable actions (i.e.
obs(tr′)) and leading to a frame ψ ∼ φ.
Next, we remark that thanks to the constraint on phases,
putting Ai in parallel instead of in sequence (as done in
A∀) allows to complete the same execution. We can also
remove !OpenBal from the starting multiset whilst preserving
the executability. We thus get the desired execution with the
appropriate multiset of processes at the beginning.
In order to conclude, we shall prove Res(tr, φ) = Res(tr′, ψ).
In the case th = trh, it follows from ψ = φ and the fact that
tr′ has same observable actions as tr. Otherwise, we assume
Res(tr, φ) 6= Res(tr′, ψ) for the sake of the contradiction. We
remark that BB(tr, φ) = BB(tr′, ψ) follows from φ ∼ ψ
and obs(tr) = obs(tr′). Further, there exists an handle w such
that out(cb, w) ∈ tr (and thus out(cb, w) ∈ tr′), Ψb[wφ] ↓ u
for some u (and thus Ψb[wψ] ↓ u′ for some u′ since φ ∼ ψ
and Ψb is a public term), and Extract(wφ) ↓ vl ∈ V ∪ {⊥},
Extract(wψ) ↓ vr ∈ V ∪ {⊥} with vl 6= vr. At least on one
side, the extraction does not lead to ⊥ (otherwise we have
⊥ = ⊥). By symmetry, we assume Extract(wφ)↓vl ∈ V . We
now consider a straightforward extension of the previously
considered execution of the biprocess BD by adding the trace
trO = τ.in(cu, w).τthen.out(cu, we). This trace corresponds
to the replication of the OpenBal process and a usage of one
instance of the oracle which tries to extract a vote from the
ballot w. Note that the given execution can be extended with
this trace on the left (the conditional holds) and because BD
is diff-equivalent, on the right as well. We call φOl (resp. φ
O
r )
the resulting frame on the left (resp. on the right). By diff-
equivalence, it holds that φOl ∼ φ
O
r . We remark that weφl =E
vl and weφr =E vr. Recall that vl and vr are two different
public constants not involved in equations in E. Therefore,
weφr 6=E vl. Hence the recipe eq(we, vl) (remind that vl is
a public constant) does not fail when applied on the left (i.e.
on φl) but does fail when applied on the right (i.e. on φr)
contradicting φOl ∼ φ
O
r .
(⇐) Using the fact that [idA, vi] and [idB, vj ] had an honest
interaction in tr′0.phase(k) up to phase k, one can show by
gluing together phase roles the existence of a similar execution
of the form
(({V (nidA ,n
v
i ), V (n
id
B ,n
v
j )}⊎ !R⊎
A∈Ro
{A(nidA ,n
v
i ), A(n
id
B ,n
v
j )};φ0; 1)
tr′
0
.phase(k).tr′
1−−−−−−−−−→(P
′′;φ; k).
(2)
Via a similar proof than the one for ⇒, we make use of
the diff-equivalence of BD to get an execution with real role
processes when A and B did not follow the idealised trace;
otherwise, we get the execution with real role processes from
the uniqueness of executions following trh. The execution
from ({V (idA, vi), V (idB, vj)}∪ !R;φ0; 1) can then be ob-
tained by creating appropriate names since they are pairwise
distinct.
If an e-voting protocol ensures the Dishonest Condition, the
Tally Condition, and, the Relation Condition then it ensures
ballot secrecy.
Proof. Consider a fair execution (S;φ0; 1)
tr
−→(P ;φ; k).
We shall prove that there exists a fair execution
(Sr ;φ0; 1) tr
′
−→(Q;ψ; k) with obs(tr) = obs(tr
′), φ ∼ ψ
and Res(tr, φ) = Res(tr′, ψ). We distinguish two cases
whether k = 1 or not.
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If k > 1 then tr = tr0.phase(k).tr1 for some trace tr1 that
does not contain phase(·) action. We now apply Lemma V-E
and obtain a fair execution
({Rid(nidA ,n
v
0),R
v(nidA ,n
v
0),
Rid(nidB ,n
v
1),R
v(nidB ,n
v
1)}∪ !R;φ0; 1)
tr′
−→(Q;φ1; kf )
(3)
for some tr′ = tr′0.phase(k).tr
′
1 where all names in
n
id
A ,n
id
B ,n
v
0 ,n
v
1 are pairwise distinct names (except identity
and vote), such that [idA, v0] and [idB, v1] have an honest in-
teraction in tr′0.phase(k), φ1 up to phase k, obs(tr
′) = obs(tr),
φ ∼ φ1 and Res(tr, φ) = Res(tr′, φ1). We now deduce from
the diff-equivalence of BI (i.e. the Honest Relations Condition,
second item) and the fact that diff-equivalence is stable by
bijection of names, an execution:
({Rid(nidA ,n
v
1),R
v(nidB ,n
v
0),
Rid(nidB ,n
v
0),R
v(nidA ,n
v
1)}∪ !R;φ0; 1)
tr′
−→(Q
′;ψ′; kf )
(4)
with ψ ∼ φ1. Remark that in the latter execution, processes
labelled [idA, v1] (resp. [idB, v0]) have an honest interaction
in tr′0.phase(k), ψ
′ up to phase k as well. This relies on the
fact that the honest trace is phase-oblivious by the Honest
Relations Condition. Thereby, if (i) a voter follows the honest
trace up to phase k for all phases having the same leaking
labels isolately, then (ii) it follows the honest trace up to phase
k. Property (i) for A and B on Execution 4 follows from the
fact this property holds in Execution 3 and is transferred to
Execution 4 by the diff-equivalence. For instance, processes in
Rid(nidA ,n
v
0) and R
v(nidB ,n
v
1) follow the honest trace phase-
by-phase up to phase k in Execution 3 (because voters A and
B follow the honest trace up to phase k in that execution).
By diff-equivalence,Rid(nidA ,n
v
1) andR
v(nidA ,n
v
1) follow the
honest trace in Execution 4 up to phase k and thus processes
labelled [idA, v1] have an honest interaction in Execution 4
up to phase k. We also have that [idA, v1] casts a ballot, if
and only if, [idB , v0] does so. Therefore, Execution 4 is fair
as well. By Lemma V-E, we deduce the existence of a fair
execution
(Sr;φ0; 1) tr
′′
−−→(Q
′′;ψ1; kf )
such that obs(tr′′) = obs(tr′), ψ ∼ ψ1 and Res(tr′, ψ) =
Res(tr′′, ψ1).
It remains to show that Res(tr0, φ0) = Res(tr
′′, ψ0). Since
Res(tr′, ψ) = Res(tr′′, ψ1) and Res(tr0, φ0) = Res(tr
′, φ1),
it suffices to show Res(tr′, φ1) = Res(tr
′, ψ). We let φl = φ1,
φr = ψ, bl = BB(tr
′, φl), and, br = BB(tr
′, φr). First, we
have that if out(cb, wb) occurs in tr
′ then wb induces a valid
ballot on the left if, and only if, it induces a valid ballot on
the right. This is because φl ∼ φr and Ψb[] is a public term
(and thus induces a recipe). Let us first assume that either idA
or idB casts a ballot. In such a case, by fairness, both cast a
ballot. Therefore, there are two handles w0, w1 corresponding
to the honest casting of [idA, v0] (resp. [idA, v1]) and [idB, v1]
(resp. [idB, v0]) on the left (resp. on the right). We have that
Extract(wjφl)↓vj and Extract(wjφr)↓v1−j for all j = 0..1.
We can now split the set of valid ballots into ballots w0, w1
and the others: for d ∈ {l, r}, one has bd = {w0φd, w1φd} ⊎
{b1d, . . . , b
l
d} where b
i
d = w
iφd and Extract({w0φl, w1φl}) =
Extract({w0φr , w1φr}) = {v0, v1}#. It remains to show that
Extract({b1l , . . . , b
l
l}) = Extract({b
1
r, . . . , b
l
r}). We actually
have that Extract(bir) = Extract(b
i
r) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l as a
direct consequence of the Tally Condition. If neither A nor
B cast a ballot then Res(tr′, φ1) = Res(tr
′, ψ) stems from
Extract(bir) = Extract(b
i
r) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
If k = 1 then no phase(·) action occurs in tr.
In particular, the phase roles for phase 1 can also
perform this execution. Formally, replacing S by the
following process allows for performing the same
execution:
⊎
A∈Ro∪V
{A1(nidA ,n
v
i ), A
1(nidB ,n
v
j )}⊎!R.
As a subset of the latter,
Rid(nidA ,n
v
1),R
v(nidB ,n
v
0),R
id(nidB ,n
v
0),R
v(nidA ,n
v
1)}∪ !R
is also able to perform the given execution. We conclude
by the Honest relation condition. The proof that Res(·) is
preserved is a particular case of the previously discussed
proof for the k > 1 case.
(Resuming Section VI-A) (Syntactical check) If (i) the vote
vi does not syntactically occur at all in outputs of id-leaking
phases (i.e. in Rid(nidi ,n
v
i )) and (ii) there is no vote-leaking
phase before an id-leaking phase in the honest trace th then
the condition is satisfied since item 2 trivially holds then.
We now state that BT can be used to verify the Tally
Condition. If BT is diff-equivalent then B is diff-equivalent
and the protocol ensures the Tally Condition.
Proof. Diff-equivalence is stable by removal of processes in
the initial multiset. Formally, for a biprocess B, if B = ({P}∪
Q;φ) is diff-equivalent then (Q;φ) is diff-equivalent. This
implies that B is diff-equivalent as well. Now, let us show
that the Tally condition holds.
We can actually prove that the diff-equivalence of BT implies
that for any execution of B, the two executions on both sides
yield exactly the same tally’s outcome (w.r.t. Res(·)). The
proof of this is the same as the proof of the Lemma V-E
in Appendix F.
G. Example of modified protocol using swapping
We consider the voter process from Example 8; i.e.
V (id, v) = 1 : out(a, id).2 : out(a, v). We have that
({V (A, choice[v1, v2]), V (B, choice[v2, v2])}; ∅; 1) is not
diff-equivalent since after the two outputs out(a,A),
out(a,B), the resulting multiset of processes is
{out(a, choice[v1, v2]), out(a, choice[v2, v1])} which is
obviously not diff-equivalent. However, if one is allowed
to swap the order of the two processes on the right side
of that biprocess, he would obtain {out(a, choice[v1, v1]),
out(a, choice[v2; v2, )]} which is diff-equivalent.
H. Restrictions of the swapping technique
We here provide support for the claims we made in the intro-
duction about the different problems the swapping approach
cannot tackle (while our approach can). First, it cannot deal
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with honest roles present in different phases (except for the
voter role). Indeed, such roles would require synchronisation
barriers. Moreover, because a potentially unbounded number
of dishonest voters communicate with those authorities, this
requires modelling an unbounded number of sessions for
them. However, in the swapping approach, there cannot be a
replication underneath a synchronisation barrier, which mean
we cannot model such roles. We encountered this problem for
a simplified variant of JCJ and Belenios: we failed to model an
unbounded number of sessions of the registrar role that creates
and sends credentials to voters in the registration phase and
then send encrypted credentials to the bulletin box (so that the
latter can verify eligibility).
Second, and similarly, it cannot tackle threat models without
a dishonest voter, because this would require explicitly mod-
elling an arbitrary number of honest voters. Since they are
present in multiple phases, this would require replication.
Third, when it comes to leveraging the swapping technique
in ProVerif, spurious attacks arise when the protocol’s security
also relies on the freshness of some data from previous phases.
The problem is that for the generated processes, ProVerif
considers two different sessions of a certain phase using the
same data resulting from one single session of a previous
phase, as a valid execution. The reason is that, for a fixed
swap strategy, ProVerif replaces synchronisation barriers of
a process P by private communications exchanging all data
the process currently knows with another process Q with
which the swap occurs. Those new private communications
are abstracted by the Horn-Clause approximations used by
ProVerif: an input on a private channel p is not consumed
upon use, and can be replayed later on. Therefore, ProVerif
also explores the possibility of swapping data with an old
session of Q whose data has already been swapped before.
This caused the spurious attacks for JCJ and Belenios (see
Figure 3); the credential being the fresh data coming from the
registration phase and used during the voting phase.
Finally, the swapping technique suffers from an exponential
blow up. Indeed, the compiler produces Πj(nj !) processes
where ni is the number of processes active at phase i (e.g.
3 phases, ni = 3 lead to 216 processes to verify). This is
unsurprising since the compiler has to generate as many pro-
cesses as possible swaps, to guess one that yields security. The
same problem arises in Tamarin implementing the swapping
technique through multisets [18] since the tool may have to
explore all possible shufflings of multisets for each phase.
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